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ASSET FORFEITURE: GIVING UP YOUR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress has responded to its losing the war on crime with
the threat of asset forfeiture, especially in the areas of organized
crime and the drug trade.' These areas are thought to be a threat
to National Security and therefore Congress has given them the
utmost priority. Congress has added and then expanded asset for-
feiture provisions for law enforcement. Congress intended to take
the profit out of crime, deter further illegal activity and to produce
revenue to further finance the battle.2 As a result, forfeiture has
become a self-financing process.' Forfeiture has since expanded
and now has crossed the boundaries of constitutional limitations
in both federal and state forms.
For these very reasons, asset forfeiture has come under tre-
mendous fire in the past several years. Critics describe the power
of asset forfeiture as the "full weight of the Government" bearing
1. "There were 55,000 addicts in N.Y.C. Today there are over 335,000
addicts, and we are losing the war! ... i]n 1968, we used to seize kilos of cocaine
and heroin. Today, we seize it by the ton. Gentlemen, we are losing the war." 135
CONG. REc. E2162-02, E2162 (1989) (statement of Francis J. Wolfe, retired New
York policeman); "It can be won only if we have the courage to use every weapon
at our disposal." 136 CONG. REc. E735-01, E736 (1990) (statement of Rep.
Gingrich).
2. Speaking in favor of limiting the power of governmental asset forfeiture,
Mark J. Kappelhoff, testified before the Judiciary Committee and stated "it was
thought of as some form of poetic justice: seizing the assets of major drug
traffickers and using these assets to fund legitimate law enforcement initiatives."
The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearings On H.R. 1916 Before The House
Committee On The Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (statement of Mark J.
Kappelhoff, Legislative Counsel ACLU).
3. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 established the Special Forfeiture Fund,
to be administered by the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy.
The Special Forfeiture Fund supports high-priority drug control programs, as
defined by the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. This Fund,
which began operation in fiscal year 1990, receives deposits from the Department
of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund and the Department of the Treasury Assets
Forfeiture Fund. The monies in the Fund are transferred to the drug control
agencies in accordance with the priorities articulated in the National Drug
Control Strategy. Appendix: Proposed 1996 Budget of the United States
Government, Office of Management and Budget, February 1995.
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against a criminal defendant. 4 Even though forfeiture finds its
roots in English law5 and this country has recognized it since the
colonial period,6 an unprecedented expansion in the power of law
enforcement to seize property has occurred in recent years. 7 Con-
sequently, forfeiture has become one of the greatest weapons in
the war on crime." The defense bar has strongly opposed these
broad powers of the government, especially the government's abil-
ity to bring civil actions in conjunction with criminal ones. 9 The
4. U.S. Amicus Brief at 19, United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996)
(Nos. 95-345, 95-346). The term "Government" is used to represent the executive
branch, specifically the United States Attorney's Office and the power given to it
by Congress.
5. See United States v. Saccoccia, 823 F. Supp. 994, 1000 (D.R.I. 1993); See
generally Avery v. Everett, 18 N.E. 148 (N.Y. 1888).
6. Abuses of the bill of attainder by the English monarchy led the Framers of
our Constitution to limit the application of criminal forfeiture. Thus Article III,
Section 3 prohibits forfeiture as a penalty for treason except during the life of the
person attainted. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. In 1790, the First Congress extended
that prohibition by eliminating forfeiture of one's estate and corruption of blood
as penalties for all felonies. Act of April 30, 1790, Ch. 9, § 24, 1 Statutes at Large
117. See United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 927 (1980).
7. The United States has received from asset forfeitures (in millions)
1986-$93.7
1989-$580.8
1992-$531
1987-$177.6
1990-$459.6
1993-$555.7
1988-$205.9
1991-$643.6
1994-$549.9
(Source: Department of Justice.)
Sharon Walsh, Give and Take on the Hot Issue of Asset Forfeiture, WASH. POST,
March 11, 1996, at F07.
8. "In 1994 the Justice Department's asset forfeiture fund totaled $549.9
million. The fund has taken in $2.7 billion in the past five years, and much of it
is distributed to law enforcement agencies or victims of crimes." Id.
9. The motivation this set-up provides for law enforcement to zealously -
or overzealously - pursue cases that involve forfeitable property is clear.
And dangerous. Abuses are common both in civil and criminal cases.
Police and prosecutors become bounty hunters. The assets of suspects,
including the innocent, become the bounty. Law enforcement agents not
only lust after the assets of the accused, they have come to depend on
the revenues they get through forfeiture.
says David B. Smith, co-chair of the forfeiture abuse task force of the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and an attorney in Virginia. Smith
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Second Circuit has also expressed its deep concern that the power
of forfeiture has gone too far.10
Forfeiture is "[a] comprehensive term which means a divesti-
ture of specific property without compensation; it imposes a loss
by taking away some preexisting valid right without compensa-
tion."" Historically, the government can not take property with-
out constitutional restraints such as just compensation or due
process of law. However, modern developments in asset forfeiture
have given the government almost unbridled power to seize nearly
any assets related to illegal activity. The constitutional protection
this country once enjoyed has given way to Congress' belief that
they must employ this weapon in the war on crime.' 2 The purpose
knows the issue from both sides. He was formerly deputy chief of asset forfeiture
at the U.S. Department of Justice.
Legal Extortion Drug Seizure Laws, ARiz. REPUBLIC (PHOENIX GAzETrE),
November 27, 1995, at B6.
"'If you want to use that 'war on drugs' analogy, then forfeiture is like giving the
troops permission to loot,' says Thomas Lorenzi, president-elect of the Louisiana
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers." 137 CONG. REC. E3059-03, E3060
(1991).
10. United States v. All Assets Of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc, 971 F.2d 896,
905 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating "[we continue to be enormously troubled by the
government's increasing and virtually unchecked use of the civil forfeiture
statutes and the disregard for due process that is buried in those statutes").
11. BLAcies LAW DIcTIoNARY 650 (6th ed. 1990).
12. See S. REP. No. 98-225, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374-404 (forfeiture section) (noting that enhanced forfeiture
was necessary because "the traditional criminal sanctions of fine and
imprisonment are inadequate to deter or punish the enormously profitable trade
in dangerous drugs ....
It is an enforcement tool with notable interrelated benefits. It pays for
its own property management costs and relieves additional burdens that
otherwise would fall to our law abiding citizens and taxpayers. It
strengthens law enforcement by rechanneling forfeited value back into
this most fundamental societal purpose. It promotes cooperation among
federal, state and local police around the country through our ability to
equitably share forfeited assets with those who have assisted in our
investigations. It allows for victim restitution by permitting us to
return the forfeited assets of criminals to those who were once their
prey. Under the Weed and Seed Program, it turns tainted properties
back to constructive community use. It even sanctions the donation of
forfeited assets to charitable organizations and the transfer of forfeited
monies to support our national effort to reduce the demand for illegal
drugs. Judiciary Committee of the United States House of
Representatives: Hearing on H.R. 1916 The Civil Asset Forfeiture
Reform Act July 22, 1986, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. (1996) (opening
1997] 529
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of this article is to provide a comprehensive explanation of the
development of forfeiture, the legal procedures and the infringe-
ment on Constitutional rights. The current forfeiture laws, how-
ever justified, infringe upon the United States Constitution. This
infringement forces us to consider whether we, as a country, are
willing to pay this cost for the war on crime?' 3
This article will discuss both criminal and civil forfeiture, the
related issues and recent developments as well as the unique
issues presented when a civil forfeiture action follows a criminal
action in the same case.' 4 Section I will provide a brief history of
forfeiture and the current status of the law in this area. Section II
will illustrate the procedures which the government follows in for-
feiture actions. Section III will discuss the defenses against forfei-
ture. Section IV will discuss how forfeiture has survived the many
constitutional challenges. The last two sections illustrate how
Congress has balanced the need for powerful weapons in combat-
ing crime against the constitutional rights of this country and
found the balance in favor of forfeiture.' 5
statement of Jan P. Blanton, Director, Treasury Executive Office for
Asset Forfeiture.
13. "It behooves us to think that it may profit us very little to win the war on
drugs if in the process we lose our soul." 136 CONG. REc. S8997-02, S9014 (1990)
(quoting Judge William Schwarzar).
14. "Forfeitures, a cornerstone of the government's war on drugs, enable
prosecutors to take a double-barreled approach by allowing civil penalties in
addition to criminal charges." Joy Powell, Trial to Put Spotlight On Forfeiture
Laws Seizure Case to Look At Constitutionality Seizures, Forfeitures, OMAHA
WORLD-HERALD, August 6, 1996, at 1.
15. "The ACLU believes that all civil forfeiture schemes inherently violate
fundamental constitutional rights, including the right not to be deprived of
property without due process of law and the right to be free from punishment
that is disproportionate to the offense." The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act:
Hearings on H.R. 1916 Before the Judiciary Committee, 104th Cong. 1995-96
Sess. (1996) (statement of Mark J. Kappelhoff, Legislative Counsel American
Civil Liberties Union). Contrary to this position, the United States Attorney's
Office believes that forfeiture is constitutional and a necessary element in the
war on crime. See generally U.S. ATTRNEr's MAN. 9-111.210 (1990); U.S.
ATm'R Vs MAN. 9-111.220 (1990); Petitioner's Brief, Libretti v. United States,
116 S. Ct. 356 (1995) (No. 94-7427); Respondent's Brief, Austin v. United States,
509 U.S. 602 (1993) (No. 92-6073).
530 [Vol. 19:527
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II. THE HISTORY AND MODERN DEVELOPMENTS OF ASSET
FORFErruRE
The roots of asset forfeiture can be traced to biblical times
when forfeiture was based upon the theories of punishment and
restitution.16 It also existed in English common-law and has been
recognized in the United States since the colonial period. 17
Although original forfeiture principals were narrow in scope, Con-
gress has transformed forfeiture into broad powers which the Gov-
ernment wields today in its war on crime.
A The Historical Origin of Asset Forfeiture
Asset forfeiture was recognized in this country when the
Framers drafted the Constitution.18 This concept is derived from
English Law and was well known to the early United States.19 At
English common law, property which was the direct or indirect
cause of death was forfeited to the Crown as a deodand and dis-
tributed for pious uses.20 This concept can be traced to Biblical
times where in rem actions were first recognized. 2 ' Eventually,
16. See Exodus 21:28 (stating "if an ox gore a man or woman, ant they die, he
shall be stoned and his flesh shall not be eaten"). See also Oliver W. Holmes, THE
COMMON LAW C.L. (1881), reprinted in The Collected Works of Justice Holmes
(Sheldon M. Novick ed. 1995).
17. See Act of April 30, 1790, Ch. 9, § 24, 1 Statutes at Large 117. See also
United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927
(1980).
18. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 (stating "The Congress shall have Power to
declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work
Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person
attainted.").
19. The court stated:
[Tihat the party indicted of a capital offense, not yielding his body to the
sheriff at the return of the capias, shall be, by the Justices of the
Supreme Court, pronounced outlawed, and attainted of the crime
whereof he is so indicted. And from that time shall forfeit all his lands
and tenements, goods and chattels: which forfeiture, &c. after debts
paid, shall go, one half to the Governor for the time being, &c and for
defraying the charges of prosecution, trial and execution of such
criminals.
Respublica v. Doan Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 86, 91
(1784).
20. Deodand derives from Latin deo dandum meaning "a thing to be given to
God." BLAcK's LAw DIcTIoNARY 436 (6th ed. 1990). Once the property was
forfeited to the crown, it was to be applied to pious uses and to be distributed to
the alms by the high almoner.
21. See Exodus 21:28.
1997] 531
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the deodand ceased being applied to "pious uses," and became a
source of revenue for the Crown.22 The forfeiture actions of today
originated from the English law transformation of the deodand
concept.
2 3
As forfeiture developed in the early United States, property
became subject to seizure in connection with felonies or treason.24
The basis of these forfeitures was that violations of criminal laws
were offenses against the sovereign and therefore, justified deny-
ing the offender the right to own property.25 These forfeitures
were considered criminal forfeiture,26 and eventually were
expanded to include violations of customs and revenue laws based
upon the belief that a wrongdoer could be denied the right to own
property.27
Although the deodand did not become part of the common law
in the United States,28 the Constitution specifically recognized
forfeiture but limited it to the estate of a party who commits trea-
son.2 9 Before the adoption of the Constitution, the Colonies and
then the states of the Confederation were exercised in rem juris-
diction in forfeiture actions which involed violations of customs
and revenue statutes. 0 The majority of these statutes were civil
in nature.31 After the adoption of the United States Constitution,
22. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yatch Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680 (1974). See
1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 419, 423-24 (1st Am. ed. 1847); HANDSARD'S
PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, 3D SERIES 1031 (1845).
23. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 261-62; C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore,
318 U.S. 133, 137-38 (1943); 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 68-71
(3d ed. 1927); 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 352 (2d ed.
1909).
24. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682.
25. Id. England eliminated most of the forfeitures for convictions of felonies
and treason in 1870. See generally 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 299.
26. See generally Avery v. Everett, 18 N.E. 148 (N.Y. 1888).
27. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682.
28. See Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate, 188 S.W. 54 (Tenn. 1916); State v.
Champagne, 538 A.2d 193, 197 (Conn. 1988); Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683.
29. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2. See Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U.S. 202
(1876).
30. See C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 145-48 (1943); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886).
31. Examples of modem civil forfeiture statutes rooted in tradition forfeiture
are: ALA. CODE. § 32-5A-201(5) (1975) (civil forfeiture of vehicle driven without
license); CAL.VEH. CODE § 14607.4(f) (West 1996) (civil forfeiture of vehicle
driven without license); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 98 (West 1990) (civil
forfeiture for violation of civil rights); PA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 40, § 991.1410 (Supp.
1996) (failure of insurance company to register); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-6 (1981)
[Vol. 19:527532
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forfeiture actions were almost immediately enacted under federal
law and continue to proliferate today.3 2 The theory of civil forfei-
ture was based upon the belief that the property itself was tainted
and thus subject to forfeiture even when it was not owned by the
person who perpetrated the crime. 3 Currently the difference
between criminal and civil forfeiture has become blurred.3 4
B. Modern Asset Forfeiture and the Current Status of the Law
Congress broadened the power of forfeiture due to its opinion
that the enacted laws and law enforcement resources were inade-
quate to successfully fight crime.3 5 Although over 200 forfeiture
statutes exist (combining federal 36 and local37 statutes), forfeiture
was not broadened until Congress heightened is war on crime. In
1984, Congress amended the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and
Control Act of 1970 to include forfeiture of real property because
(civil forfeiture as part of abatement of nuisances); Wyo. STAT. § 30-5-119 (1995)
(violation of Wyoming oil and gas act of 1977).
32. Act of July 31, 1789, §§ 12, 16, 1 Stat. 39, 47; Act of Aug. 4, 1790, §§ 13, 22,
27, 28, 67, 1 Stat. 157, 161, 163, 176; Act of Mar. 22, 1794, 1 Stat. 347; Act of
Mar. 2, 1807, 2 Stat. 426. See supra note 31. See also infra part II.B.
33. Saccoccia, 823 F. Supp. at 1000.
34. For example, civil forfeiture is considered a penalty under the Excessive
Fines clause but not a penalty under the Double Jeopardy clause. United States
v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2140 (1996) (civil forfeiture not a penalty for purposes
of Double Jeopardy); United States v. Austin, 509 U.S. 602, 613 (1993) (dealing
with forfeiture as punishment).
35. 137 CONG. REC. S3021-02, S3043 (1991) (statement of Senator Biden)
(stating "Our streets are unsafe because our police forces are undermanned and
overwhelmed. They can never be safe again until we reverse this imbalance.").
"The nation's state and local law enforcement officers-our front lines in the 'war'
against violent criminals and drug traffickers-are out-gunned, under-manned
and ill-equipped for the new challenges of law enforcement in the 1990s." 137
CONG. REc. S3021-02, S3071 (1991) (statement of Sen. Biden).
36. Examples of Federal Asset Forfeiture Statutes include: Federal Aviation
Act of 1958, the Contraband Seizure Act, The Copyrights Act, the customs laws,
the Export Control Act of 1949, the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, the
Federal Seed Act, the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, the Hours of Service Act, the
Animal Welfare Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act, the neutrality laws,
laws relating to cigarettes, liquor, narcotics and dangerous drugs, other
controlled substances, gambling, war materials, pre-Columbian artifacts,
coinage, firearms, locomotive inspection (45 U.S.C. §§ 22, 23, 28 to 33 repealed
Pub. L. 103-272, § 7(b), July 5, 1995, 108 Stat. 1579), the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, prison-made goods (18 U.S.C. §§ 1761-62 (1994)), the Safety
Appliance Act, standard barrels (15 U.S.C. §§ 231-42 (1994)), the Sugar Act of
1948, and the Twenty-Eight Hour Law. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.55(d).
37. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
5331997]
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the "traditional criminal sanctions of fines and imprisonment
[were] inadequate to deter or punish the enormously profitable
trade in dangerous drugs.""' This expansion in forfeiture power
was enacted in, among other areas, money laundering, sexual
exploitation of children, and protection of intellectual property.
3 9
The United States Attorney's Office (USAO) responded to
Congress' expansion of forfeiture power by increasing its emphasis
upon forfeiture as well. 40 The amount of assets which have been
seized due to this broadening of forfeiture power has jumped dra-
matically over the years.4 1 Additionally, forfeitures have
increased to such a volume that the USAO has been forced to reor-
ganize in order to manage seized assets.42
Modern asset forfeiture falls into two basic categories, crimi-
nal and civil.43 Although both amount to the taking of property
without compensation, the legal theories and legal processes asso-
ciated with both are quite different. Additionally, either action or
38. S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 225 (1983).
"The asset forfeiture program was begun in 1984 to help pay a portion of
the costs of the war on drugs with funds seized from drug traffickers. In
addition, the forfeiture program was intended to increase deterrence by
confiscating the illegally earned property and wealth of drug dealers,
who viewed imprisonment as the cost of doing business. Since its
inception, the asset forfeiture program has grown and expanded
through the increased use of civil and administrative forfeitures."
(H.R. REP. No. 884, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. §103 (1995). See also H.R. REP. No.
1030, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 215, § 306 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N.
3182, 3398.
39. See discussion infra part II.B.3.
40. In response to the increase on asset forfeiture, the Attorney General
formed the Asset Forfeiture Office. In addition to other responsibilities, this
office has responsibility for all civil forfeiture proceedings assigned to the
Criminal Division. This office also advises and assists regional offices in the
handling of forfeiture cases and making decisions regarding petitions for
remission or mitigation of forfeiture. U.S. A'rYs. MAN. 9-3.601 (1992). "As the
Department of Justice has placed greater emphasis on Asset Forfeiture, the need
for an accurate accounting system of the assets being forfeited by the United
States Attorney's offices has arisen." U.S. ATrys. MAN. 3-7.111 (1992).
41. See supra note 8.
42. The USAO has created a Asset Forfeiture Office to provide for a more
effective use of civil and criminal forfeiture proceedings to deprive criminals of
the proceeds of their crimes. U.S. Arrys. MAN. 9-3.400(L).
43. See infra part II.B. (discussing the blurred distinction between civil and
criminal forfeiture actions).
[Vol. 19:527534
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both actions can be brought based upon the same facts or
occurrences."
1. Criminal Forfeiture
Criminal forfeiture is an in personam4 5 action. As such, the
defendant must be convicted of or plead guilty to violations of cer-
tain federal statutes before the government gains title. The most
powerful federal forfeiture statutes are in four primary areas:
money laundering;' obscene material, sexual exploitation and
other abuse of children;47 RICO;4 and drug trafficking.49
Criminal forfeiture must meet the higher burdens of due pro-
cess placed upon the criminal justice system. 0 One such burden
on the government is that criminal forfeiture requires that the
indictment or information list the property subject to forfeiture.5 '
Additionally, the disposition of a criminal forfeiture is to be
accomplished by special verdict.52 These requirements force the
44. See discussion infra part II.B.1-3.
45. "Against the person. Action seeking judgment against a person involving
his personal rights and based on jurisdiction of his person." BLAcies LAw
DICTIONARY 791 (6th ed. (1990)).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 982 (1994).
47. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1467, 2253 (1994).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1994).
49. 21 U.S.C. § 851 (1994).
50. In a criminal forfeiture proceeding, under the common law, the defendant
was apparently entitled to notice, trial, and a special jury finding on the factual
issues surrounding the declaration of forfeiture which followed his criminal
conviction. This has been codified in FED. R. CRni. P. 7(c)(2), 31 and 32.
51. FED. R. Cinm. P. 7(c)(2) (stating "No judgment of forfeiture may be entered
in a criminal proceeding, unless the indictment or the information shall allege
the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture."). Initially, the
Department of Justice did not recommended including a forfeiture provision in
an indictment even when the Government did not intend to pursue the criminal
forfeiture. The case which originally prompted this recommendation by the
Department was United States v. Hall, 521 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1975) (involving an
indictment dismissal for violation of FED. R. Cnmi. P. 7(cX2)). Rule 7(c)(2) has
since been amended in specific response to the Hall decision. See Advisory
Committee Notes to 1979 amendment. Additionally, subsequent case law has
further negated Hall's authority. See United States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716 (3d
Cir. 1993); United States v. Seifuddin, 820 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Bolar, 569 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Rupley, 706 F.
Supp. 751 (D. Nev. 1989); United States v. Veliotis, 586 F. Supp. 1512 (S.D.N.Y.
1984); United States v. Brigance, 472 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D. Tex. 1979); United
States v. Bergdoll, 412 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Del. 1976).
52. FED. R. Cium. P. 31(e) (stating "If the indictment or the information
alleges that an interest or Oroperty is subject to criminal forfeiture, a special
19971 535
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government to identify the property to be seized prior to trial or
stay the proceeding and return a superseding indictment when
property is later identified. Practically however, property which is
not identified pre-indictment does not usually become subject to
criminal forfeiture.53
Once the property is identified and the case has gone to trial,
there is much confusion as to the burden of proof which the gov-
ernment must bear to prove the criminal forfeiture count.54 due
process requires that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard be
applied to the elements of a criminal offense.55 Therefore, the
question becomes whether the criminal forfeiture count is a part
of the substantive offense or merely part of the sentencing pro-
cess. 56 A less strenuous standard for criminal forfeiture will arise
only if Congress intended criminal forfeiture to be a part of the
sentencing process.5 7 A discussion of the manner in which federal
circuit courts have struggled with the correct burden of proof
when applying forfeiture in drug trafficking statutes is helpful to
highlight the controversy.
verdict shall be returned as to the extent of the interest or property subject to
forfeiture, if any."). The assumption of the draft is that the amount of the
interest or property subject to criminal forfeiture is an element of the offense to
be alleged and proved. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31, notes to 1972 amendments. See FED.
R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2), advisory committee notes. A criminal forfeiture "is plainly a
criminal, as opposed to civil, matter." United States v. Garrett, 727 F.2d 1003,
1012 (11th Cir. 1984), affd, 471 U.S. 773 (1985).) The Eleventh Circuit held that
"under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant is entitled to a jury trial on
the issue whether a particular asset is forfeitable." Id.
53. However, the risk of civil forfeiture is always present since it does not
depend upon criminal forfeiture or a criminal conviction. United States v.
Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2140 (1996); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring
v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235 (1972); In re Various Items of Personal
Property, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931).
54. Some early cases required the government to show that it would more
likely than not to convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was guilty and the assets were forfeitable. See United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d
1293, 1297-98 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, 468 U.S. 1206 (1984), affd on reh'g, 777
F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 616-18 (9th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 679, 283-83 (D. Md. 1976). The
1984 amendments significantly overhauled the drug statutes, clearly
establishing that the government should be required to show no more than
probable cause that assets are subject to forfeiture. United States v. Monsanto,
924 F.2d 1186 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 382 (1991).
55. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 204 (1977).
56. See Libretti v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 356 (1995).
57. United States v. Elgersma, 971 F.2d 690, 692 (11th Cir. 1992).
536 [Vol. 19:527
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The Fourth Circuit addressed this question and reasoned that
if criminal forfeiture under the drug trafficking statutes5 is an
element of the underlying violation or is a separate substantive
offense, then it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 9 On
the other hand, if forfeiture is a question of sentencing, then the
government need only prove the forfeiture count by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.6 °
According to the Fourth Circuit's interpretation criminal for-
feiture under the drug trafficking statute is punishment. First,
the language of the statute plainly indicates that criminal forfeit-
ures are intended as punishment for substantive offenses laid out
elsewhere in Title 21. In particular, the statutory language pro-
vides that forfeitures apply to "[alny person convicted of a viola-
tion"61 of the drug laws, which presupposes that the defendant
has already been tried and convicted of the substantive offense.
The section goes on to state that "[t]he court, in imposing sentence
on such person, shall order in addition to any other sentence
imposed pursuant to this subchapter.., that the person forfeit to
the United States all property described in this subsection."62
This language assumes that forfeitures are a penalty and are to be
imposed just like any other penalty. Thus, the statute leads
directly to the conclusion that the preponderance standard should
govern forfeiture questions. 63 The majority of the other circuits
have agreed with the Fourth Circuit and held that the govern-
ment must prove the drug offense beyond a reasonable doubt, but
only prove forfeiture by a preponderance of the evidence in drug
58. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1994).
59. See Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
60. United States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150, 1156 (4th Cir. 1995).
61. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1994).
62. Id.
63. United States v. Tanner, 61 F.3d 231, 234 (4th Cir. 1995).
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cases.6 ' The same conclusion has been held for RICO,65 money
laundering,6 6 and most other criminal forfeiture provisions.
Under the Fourth Circuits' reasoning, the government must
follow a two step approach to successfully obtaining criminal for-
feiture. First, the required elements of the criminal offense must
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.67 Second, the fact that the
property was involved, furthered or was proceeds from illegal
activities must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. 8
The 1984 amendments to the drug statutes codified this reasoning
and the Fourth Circuit's procedure exists today.
64. See United States v. Michell's Tavern, 39 F.3d 684, 696 (7th Cir. 1994).
See also United States v. Bieri, 21 F.3d 819, 822 (8th Cir., 1994) (stating that
although charged as a count in the indictment, criminal forfeiture is neither an
element of a criminal offense nor a criminal offense itself. Therefore, proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is neither constitutionally nor statutorily mandated);
United States v. Elgersma, 971 F.2d 690, 693 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that the
preponderance of the evidence standard applies to forfeiture under section
853(a)(1)); United States v. Smith, 966 F.2d 1045, 1052 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding
that the government must prove that property is subject to criminal forfeiture
under section 853(a) by a preponderance of the evidence); United States v. 228
Acres of Land and Dwelling, 916 F.2d 808, 814 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1091 (1991); United States v. Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d 1560, 1577
(9th Cir. 1989) (stating that the legislative history makes clear that Congress
sought to make the government's burden of proof in criminal forfeitures the same
as that in the civil realm).
65. United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that the
government's burden of proof in forfeiture proceeding under Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act, with respect to relationship
between criminal conduct and property interest to be forfeited, is beyond a
reasonable doubt standard, and that if Congress intended such standard for
RICO forfeiture proceeding, inasmuch as if it had wanted a preponderance
standard, it would have so stated specifically as it did when it created a similar
criminal forfeiture mechanism in 18 U.S.C. § 853 (1994)).
66. United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050 (3d Cir. 1996) (ordering forfeiture of
two pieces of jewelry, finding by a preponderance of the evidence that they were
items of personal property traceable to the money involved in the money-
laundering violations); United States v. Myers, 21 F.3d 826, 828 (8th Cir. 1994)
(stating that the preponderance standard of proof applies to forfeiture under 18
U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (1994) as well as under section 853(aX2)).
67. See Tanner, 61 F.3d at 234.
68. Id.
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2. Civil Forfeiture is an in rem action
Civil Forfeiture is an in rem action.69 Many of the protections
afforded the criminal defendant are not present in civil forfeiture
actions. 70 The drug trafficking statutes are again useful in illus-
trating civil forfeiture. For civil forfeiture, the Government must
make an initial showing of probable cause that property is subject
to forfeiture. 71 This showing does not require proof by preponder-
ance of the evidence, but rather the Government need only estab-
lish reasonable grounds, which rises above the level of mere
suspicion, to believe that certain property is subject to forfeiture. 72
69. "In the strict sense of the term, a proceeding in rem' is one which is taken
directly against property or one which is brought to enforce a right in the thing
itself." BLAcis LAw DIcTIoNARY 793 (6th ed. (1990). [in a larger and more
general. sense, the [term is] applied to actions between parties, where the direct
object is to reach and dispose of property owned by them, or of some interest
therein." Id.
70. United States v. Real Property Commonly Known as 16899 S.W.
Greenbrier, Lake Oswego, Clackamas County, Oregon, 774 F. Supp. 1267, 1271
(D. Or. 1991) (recognizing that there are distinctions between civil forfeiture and
criminal forfeiture, and that some of the protections available in criminal
forfeiture actions are not present in civil forfeiture actions). See United States v.
Tax Lot 1500, 861 F.2d 232, 234-35 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 954
(1989) (stating that the proportionality requirement of Eighth Amendment is not
applicable in civil forfeiture cases). See also United States v. 57,261 Items of
Drug Paraphernalia, 869 F.2d 955, 959 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 933
(1989) (stating that where both civil and criminal forfeiture statutes applied to
the importation of drug paraphernalia, neither statute was exclusive and that
the government could choose to proceed under the civil forfeiture provision,
despite the existence of a related criminal case against the claimant).
71. 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1994). This section governs the burden of proof in
forfeiture proceedings under § 881 and § 981 and provides that once the
Government has shown probable cause the property is subject to forfeiture.
United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2148 (1996).
72. United States v. Two Parcels of Property Located at 19 and 25 Castle
Street, 31 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 1994); See United States. v. $5000.00 in U.S.
Currency, 40 F.3d 846 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. $31,990 in U.S. Currency,
982 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. $121,100.00 in U.S. Currency, 999
F.2d 1503 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating that in a civil forfeiture proceeding respecting
property allegedly to be used or traceable to be used to purchase a controlled
substance, once the claimant has established standing as owner of contested
property, the government then bears the burden of establishing probable cause
for belief that the property to be forfeited is substantially connected to drug
dealing); United States v. One Parcel of Real Property With Bldgs.,
Appurtenances, and Improvements, Known as Plat 20, Lot 17, Great Harbor
Neck, New Shoreham, R.I., 960 F.2d 200 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. One
1987 Mercedes 560 SEL, 919 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. U.S.
Currency in the Amount of $228,536.00, 895 F.2d 908, (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 495
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These reasonable grounds can be supported by less than prima
facie proof but require more than mere suspicion.73 The govern-
ment may satisfy its burden through circumstantial evidence.
74
Once the government has met its burden, the burden then shifts
to the claimant to show by a preponderance of evidence that the
property was not subject to forfeiture.75
The claimant opposing forfeiture must first establish standing
to challenge the forfeiture.76 Next, the claimant must show by a
preponderance of evidence that either the property was not used
for an illegal purpose or that any the illegal use was without the
U.S. 958 (1990); United States v. Premises and Real Property at 4492 South
Livonia Rd., Livonia, N.Y., 889 F.2d 1258 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied 97 F.2d 659
(1989); United States v. Twenty-Two Thousand, Two Hundred Eighty Seven
Dollars ($22,287.00), U.S. Currency, 709 F.2d 442 (6th Cir. 1983).
73. U.S. ArTORN'Vs MAN. 9-111.520.
74. United States v. One 1976 Ford F-150 Pick-Up VIN F14YUB03797, 769
F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1985).
75. United States v. Certain Real Property 566 Hendrickson Blvd., Clawson,
Oakland County, Mich., 986 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1993).
76. See United States v. Various Computers And Computer Equipment, 82
F.3d 582, 585 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that colorable claim to ownership of the
computers allowed defendant to at least challenge the forfeiture proceedings);
Torres v. $36,256.80 U.S. Currency, 25 F.3d 1154, 1157 (2d Cir. 1994) (Forfeiture
challenger asserted an ownership interest sufficient to confer standing to contest
the forfeiture.); United States v. $191,910.00 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 1051 (9th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Amiel, 995 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v.
One 1973 Rolls Royce, V.I.N. SRH-16266, 43 F.3d 794 (3d Cir. 1994) (Nominal or
straw owners lacked standing to challenge forfeiture proceeding under drug
forfeiture statutes.); United States v. $20,193.39 U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 344 (9th
Cir. 1994) (Unsecured creditor lacked standing to challenge civil forfeiture of
property that government seized from businesses.); United States v. Eng, 951
F.2d 461, 468 (2d Cir. 1991) (The filing of a verified claim is an essential element
in establishing standing to challenge a forfeiture under Rule C(6).); United
States v. Currency $267,961.07, 916 F.2d 1104, 1107 (6th Cir. 1990) (A claimant
must possess Article III and statutory standing pursuant to Rule C(6) in order to
contest the government's forfeiture action.); Sequoia Books, Inc. v. Ingemunson,
901 F.2d 630 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. $38,000 in United States
Currency, 816 F.2d 1538, 1544 (11th Cir. 1987) ("A claimant need not own the
property in order to have standing to contest its forfeiture; a lesser property
interest, such as, a possessory interest, is sufficient for standing."); United States
v. Certain Red Property and Premises known as 218 Panther St. Newfoundland,
Pa., 745 F. Supp. 118, 120 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (claimant lacked standing to contest
forfeiture because he did not timely file claim and answer).
[Vol. 19:527540
14
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 9
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/9
ASSET FORFEITURE
knowledge or consent of the claimant.77 This defense, most com-
monly called the "innocent owner defense" is discussed below.78
Civil forfeiture allows the government to instigate a forfeiture
action under a lesser burden of proof than required to defend the
forfeiture action. This allowance is in contrast with the basic the-
ory that the plaintiff must prove its case. 79 Additionally, since the
innocence of the property owner is irrelevant, the Government can
seize assets even when there is not enough evidence to convict the
owner.8 0 This ability to seize assets becomes a very powerful tool
for prosecutors."' One can imagine the position of the "drug
dealer" when he has had his house seized because it was used in
the furtherance of drug trafficking. The burden now shifts to this
"defendant" to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
house was not used in drug trafficking or that it was not used with
his knowledge. In order for the defendant to assert this defense,
he must make a court appearance and more than likely take the
stand. Therefore, most of these drug dealers will not contest the
forfeiture for fear of future involvement with law enforcement
officers.8 2 As explained, this allocation of burden worked a hard-
ship upon property owners who wished to challenge a civil
forfeiture.8 3
77. United States v. Two Parcels of Property Located at 19 and 25 Castle
Street, 31 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 1994).
78. See infra part IV.
79. FED. R. EvID. 301; see generally Brown v. Selfridge, 224 U.S. 189 (1912);
Dunlap v. Schofield, 152 U.S. 244 (1894); Railroad Co. v. Gladmon, 82 U.S. (15
Wall.) 401 (1872); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
80. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683-87.
81. "It has been estimated that 80% of those who lose property to the
government through civil forfeitures are never charged with any crime." Henry
J. Hyde, CIVIL ASSET FoRFrruRE REFORM: HOUSE REPORT No. 879 LETTER TO
THE COMMITTEE OF THE JuDICIARY. H.R. Rep. No. 879, 104th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1997).
82. "Judicial forfeitures of cash are almost always uncontested." 135 CONG.
REC. S12622-01 (1989).
83. See United States v. Leasehold Interest in 121 Nostrand Ave., Apt. 1-C,
Brooklyn, NY, 760 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (The fact that the person who
contested the forfeiture of a public housing apartment was the leaseholder of
record and asserted the "innocent owner" defense for all intervenor- residents
was sufficient to give her standing to contest drug forfeiture action.); United
States v. All That Lot of Ground Known as 2511 E. Fairmont Ave., Baltimore
Md. 21224, 737 F. Supp. 878 (D. Md. 1990) (Claimants did not meet the burden of
proving that they were innocent owners of subject property, in light of evidence
that they knew their son was dealing in drugs and that proceeds of drug
trafficking were used to build home on property.).,
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This article will concentrate primarily upon the drug traffick-
ing and money laundering statutes. However, the issues related
to these statutes are identical to issues dealing with the exploita-
tion of children and intellectual property and are also relevant to
the criminal forfeiture statutes of the Racketeer Influence and
Corrupt Organization Act (RICO).84
3. The Statutes
Prior to the enactment of RICO, the majority of the federal
forfeiture statutes were civil in nature.8 5 In 1970, Congress
enacted RICO which was followed by statutes further designed to
combat money laundering, copyright and trademark violations,
obscene material, sexual exploitation of children, and the drug
trade.8 6 Through this legislation, Congress has attempted to
heighten its efforts in the war on crime and has expanded forfei-
ture power in these areas. Not only has this expansion of criminal
and civil actions taken place, but the latter three areas allow crim-
inal forfeiture to be instigated in combination with civil forfei-
ture.87 Given the current policy of the United States Attorney
General,88 Congress, and the White House, along with recent
Supreme Court decisions, the controversy surrounding asset for-
feiture will continue to grow.
Forfeiture has four primary goals: (1) to recover the proceeds
of a crime; (2) to remove the economic incentive to crime; (3) to
84. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1994) (involving criminal penalties); 18 U.S.C. § 1964
(1994) (involving civil penalties).
85. 7 U.S.C. § 1379i (1988) (Agricultural Act of 1938); 12 U.S.C. § 1463 (1996)
(June 13, 1933, c. 64, § 4, as added Aug. 9, 1989, Pub.L. 101-73, Title III, § 301,
103 Stat. 280); 15 U.S.C. § 50 (1973) (enacted in Sept. 26, 1914, 38 Stat. 723, as
amended Jan. 4, 1975, Pub.L. 93-637, Title II, § 203(c), 88 Stat. 2199; May 28,
1980, Pub.L. 96-252, § 6, 94 Stat. 376); 19 U.S.C. § 1436 (1994) (enacted June 17,
1930, c. 497, Title V, § 436, 46 Stat. 711); 33 U.S.C. § 1320 (1986) (June 30,
1948, c. 758, Title III, § 310, as added Oct. 18, 1972, Pub.L. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat.
860); 47 U.S.C. § 504 (1991) (enacted June 19, 1934, c. 652, Title V, § 504, 48
Stat. 1101).
86. 18 U.S.C. §§ 981, 982 (1994) (money laundering); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1467, 2253,
2254 (1994) (sexual exploitation and other abuses of children); 21 U.S.C. §§ 851,
853 (1994) (drug related crimes); 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1994) (intellectual property).
87. A civil forfeiture action can be filed before, during or after a criminal
forfeiture action due to the independent nature of each.
88. See generally the U.S. ATroRNEVs MAN. 4-4.120 (1988).
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dismantle criminal organizations and (4) to punish the crime.8 9
Although these goals have proven to be a highly effective weapon
in combating crime, they can have a significant impact on "inno-
cent" third party property owners as well as infringe upon consti-
tutional rights.90
The five primary areas in which the government utilizes for-
feiture are: racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations, drug
trafficking, money laundering, intellectual property, and obscenity
and sexual exploitation of children.
a. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
RICO provided the first powerful criminal forfeiture statutes
for the war on crime. This statute allows for the forfeiture of any
property, real or personal, which is derived from or are proceeds
from violations of the Act.9 Additionally, this statute specifically
states that property can be subject to forfeiture even when it has
been transferred unless the transferee can show he was a bona
fide purchaser for value.92 Although there is no specific civil for-
feiture provision, many RICO violations can also lead to civil for-
feiture under the money laundering statutes.93
b. Drug Trafficking
Drug trafficking vests authority for criminal and civil forfei-
ture in the Government. The criminal section specifically allows
for the forfeiture of any real or personal property obtained directly
or indirectly from illegal proceeds,94 used to facilitate the commis-
sion of any violation,95 or involved in the control over a continuing
criminal enterprise.9 6 In addition, the criminal forfeiture provi-
sion creates a presumption that the property is subject to forfei-
89. Anthony G. Hall, The Effect of Double Jeopardy on Asset Forfeiture, 32
IDAHo L. REV. 527, 528-29 (1996). Mr. Hall is an Assistant United States
Attorney for the District of Idaho.
90. See Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (after husband was
convicted of gross indecency in connection with his sexual activity with a
prostitute in a car, which he and his wife owned jointly, county prosecutor filed a
complaint alleging that the car was a public nuisance subjecting the car to
forfeiture which wife was unable to challenge).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c)(1) (1994).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1994).
94. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1) (1994).
95. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(2) (1994).
96. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(3) (1994).
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ture if the government proves by a preponderance of the evidence
that the property was acquired within a reasonable period of time
near the illegal act 97 and that there was no other likely source for
the property other than in violation of the Drug Prevention and
Control chapter. 98
The civil forfeitures provide for the forfeiture of any property
used in furtherance of illegal drug activity and is broader in scope
than the criminal provisions. 99 On its face, this section gives the
government broad power to seize property which is connected to or
is in furtherance of illegal drug activity. Drug trafficking and
money laundering are two of the most powerful statutes and have
created the bulk of modern controversy. 10 0
c. Money Laundering
The money laundering civil provision provides for a multitude
of property types which the government can seize. 101 Such prop-
erty types include that property involved in a transaction or
attempted transaction in violation of requirements for money
transactions; 0 2 transactions intending to promote illegal activ-
ity,10 3 any property traceable to such activity; 10 4 property derived
from, or traceable to, any proceeds obtained directly or indirectly
from an offense against a foreign nation involving the manufac-
ture, importation, sale, or distribution of a controlled sub-
stance; 105 and a list of statutes under Title 18.10
The criminal section allows for forfeiture of money connected
with traditional money laundering. 0 7 In addition to the many
other sections included, the drug trafficking forfeiture provision
has been incorporated, °8 thus showing Congress' recognition of
97. 21 U.S.C. § 853(d)(1) (1994).
98. 21 U.S.C. § 853(d)(2) (1994).
99. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1994).
100. See infra part IV.
101. See 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1994).
102. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313(a) and 5324(a) (1994).
103. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957 (1994).
104. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) (1994).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(B) (1994).
106. 18 U.S.C. §§ 215, 471-74, 476-81, 485-88, 501-02, 510, 542, 545, 656, 657,
842, 844, 1005-07, 1014, 1028-30, 1032, 1341, and 1343-44 (1994).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 982(a) (1994) (incorporating 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313(a), 5316, and
5324 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957, and 1960 (1994)).
108. 18 U.S.C. § 982(b) (1994).
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the importance of removing the financial, as well as other assets,
from the drug trade.
Traditionally, money laundering was only concerned with the
concealment of funds or the "cleaning" of money to convert illegiti-
mate funds into legitimate funds.10 9 However, these sections have
expanded "money laundering" to much more than mere conceal-
ment. Under the money laundering sections, real and personal
property can be seized if it is directly or indirectly related to or
derived from the proceeds of any of the offenses listed in the text of
the statutes." 0 Some of the offenses which are covered are: fed-
eral program fraud,"' major fraud against the United States," 2
concealment of assets,13 mail fraud" 4 and wire fraud." 5 As pre-
viously stated, these statutes are among the most power forfeiture
statutes in federal law." 6
d. Intellectual Property
One method in which federal law protects intellectual prop-
erty is by providing for forfeiture of both the infringing copies of
copyrighted works and all the equipment used in the manufacture
of these infringing copies." 7 Both criminal and civil forfeitures
exist under this protection. The criminal forfeiture provisions are
mandatory and require that "the court in its judgment of convic-
tion shall . . order the forfeiture" of the assets specified., s
Therefore, district courts have no discretion to decline to order for-
109. See generally United States v. LaFatch, 565 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Carrillo, 561 F.2d 1125 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Papa,
533 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Rauhoff, 525 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir.
1975); United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 334, (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v.
Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1977).
110. 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 and 982 (1994).
111. 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(D)(i) and 982(a)(3)(A) (1994).
112. 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(D)(iii) and 982(a)(3)(C) (1994).
113. 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(D)(iv) and 982(a)(3)(D) (1994) (concealment of
assets is traditional money laundering).
114. 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(D)(v) and 982(a)(3)(E) (1994).
115. 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(D)(vi) and 982(a)(3)(F) (1994).
116. In addition to the power expressed in the specific forfeiture statutes,
Congress has also enacted 18 U.S.C. § 984 (1994). The government is not
required to identify the specific property involved under civil forfeiture.
Additionally, this section also provides that "it shall not be a defense that the
property involved in such an offense has been removed and replaced by identical
property. 18 U.S.C. § 984(b)(1)(A)-(B) (1994).
117. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1994) (incorporating 18 U.S.C. § 2318 (1994)).
118. 17 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 2318(d) (1994).
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feiture as part of a judgment or conviction. Both provisions do,
however, grant to the district court some discretion over the dispo-
sition of the forfeited property. Under the criminal forfeiture pro-
visions, the court may order the "destruction or other disposition"
of this property. 119 Forfeiture reaches not only the infringing cop-
ies but also the equipment used in the manufacture of those cop-
ies.'2 0 Three general categories of property are subject to
forfeiture: (1) all criminally infringing copies or phonorecords; (2)
all plates, molds, masters and other means by which such copies
may be reproduced; and (3) all devices for manufacturing, repro-
ducing or assembling such copies or phonorecords.. 21
Novel issues will continue to arise considering the current
power and breath of forfeiture and the rapid development in tech-
nology, especially with the increased use of electronic storage and
computer systems.
e. Obscenity and Sexual Exploitation of Children
The obscenity statutes make it a criminal offense to cause a
minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of pro-
ducing any visual depiction of such conduct, to advertise child por-
nography, or to traffic in child pornography. 22  The
transportation and coercion of any individual with the intent that
the person will engage in any criminal sexual activity is also
prohibited. 123
The power of both civil and criminal forfeiture has been pro-
vided to law enforcement to combat both obscenity and exploita-
tion of children.' Although these statutes will not be stressed in
this article, it is sufficient to note the same discussions applying to
drug trafficking and money laundering apply to these offenses.
119. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 n.20
(1974).
120. 17 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1994).
121. 17 U.S.C. § 509(a) (1994).
122. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421 and 2422 (1994).
123. 1l
124. 18 U.S.C. § 1467 (1994) (providing for criminal forfeiture with regard to
obscenity); 18 U.S.C. § 2253 (1994) (providing for criminal forfeiture with regard
to sexual exploitation and other abuses of children); 18 U.S.C. § 2253 (1994)
(providing for civil forfeiture with regard to sexual exploitation and other abuses
of children).
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III. Tm LEGAL PROCESS
A. The Pleadings
The legal process of federal criminal and civil forfeitures con-
ducted by the government have several conflicts with state legal
systems and processes. These conflicts primarily involve record-
ing statutes for real property. The following material discusses
the general forfeiture process, real property, personal property
and actual seizures.
The government begins its process by identifying property to
be seized during the investigation of the illegal activity. This
identification is necessary since the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure require that for a criminal forfeiture to occur, the prop-
erty must be listed in an indictment.125 Then, the government
may file a lis pendens when it wishes to seize property. 126 Filing a
lis pendens effectively places a lien on the property by providing
notice of a potential forfeiture action against the property. This
notice protects the government's interest in the property by
preventing transfers. However, the majority of states require an
action be filed before the lis pendens can be filed. This produces a
timing problem for the government. Once a defendant has been
served an indictment or information, he may quickly transfer the
property before the lis pendens can be filed or the property can be
seized.' 27 Therefore, it becomes possible to transfer the property
to a third party and the government's forfeiture action may be
defeated.
Next, a Preliminary Order is issued and anyone can assert a
defense against the forfeiture action. The burden is placed upon
the party asserting the defense to show title should not pass to the
government. The government then publishes a notice in local
newspapers and will also send Third Party Notices to inform
125. FED. R. Cim. P. 7.
126. Even though not legally required, the United States Attorney's Office has
made filing the lis pendens a policy of the office. This policy is in respect of state
legal systems since the filing greatly benefits real property title searches.
Additionally, as discussed, the filing of a lis pendens places potential transferees
on notice of forfeiture actions and will significantly prevent an "innocent-owner"
defense from being successful. If the party is on notice, then the party is not an
innocent owner. Therefore, these reasons have given the Government a strong
interest in filing a lis pendens whenever appropriate.
127. This process has great implications when viewed in light of the "innocent
owner" defense.
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others of the forfeiture action.1 28 Lastly, unless a party success-
fully asserts a defense, a Final Order is issued and the govern-
ment obtains title over all others. Pursuant to the "relation-back"
doctrine, title vests in the government back to the time of the ille-
gal activity. 129
1. Real Property
The fact that the filing of the lis pendens is optional creates
several issues for parties performing title searches. When a lis
pendens is filed in the land records office, it places parties on
notice that the property may be subject to forfeiture. Once this
filing exists in the records office, the "innocent-owner" defense
become much more difficult, if not impossible, to assert. 13 0 This
filing places third party transferees on notice of the potential for-
feiture and greatly reduces the success of the "innocent-owner"
defense if when the property is transferred after the lis pendens is
on record.
To clarify the potential problems involving forfeiture and
third party transfers, it is helpful to view five points in time which
are associated with the legal process. When considering these
points, assume the property was used to facilitate drug trafficking
and was not purchased with drug proceeds. These assumptions
allow for a period of time where the property was used solely for
legal purposes before the illegal act. Also, assume the transferee
is a true "innocent-owner."
(1) The property owner can transfer valid title any time before
the illegal act is commenced.
(2) Property transferred after the illegal act, but before the
filing of a lis pendens allows the title to remain in the transferee
once the "innocent-owner" defense is successfully asserted. The
transferee has the best chance of successfully asserting the "inno-
cent-owner" defense at this juncture.
(3) After the lis pendens has been filed with the lands records
office, a transferee is on notice that the property may be subject to
forfeiture. This filing greatly reduces the chances of a third party
successfully asserting the 'innocent-owner" defense.
128. The government obtains a title opinion on real property and will send a
Third Party Letter to anyone appearing in the chain of title who the Government
feels should have notice, especially lien holders or financial institutions.
129. See infra part III.c.
130. The government has an interest in filing a lispendens for this very reason.
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(4) The Preliminary Order is issued, notifying all parties who
may wish to assert a defense. At this point, the third party must
assert a defense or title will vest in the government.
(5) If no party successfully asserts a defense, title vests in the
Government and relates back to the illegal act through a Final
Order. This Final Order is recorded with the land records office
where the property is located and placed in the chain of title. 131
2. Personal Property
In comparison to real property, personal property presents
less legal problems, but more logistical problems. The movable
and readily concealable nature of personal property offers a
greater chance that a property owner may be able to "hide" the
property to prevent seizure. Such problems can be illustrated
with bank accounts. In some states, property can not be seized
unless there is an indictment or information. Therefore, the gov-
ernment must be in a position to take custody of property immedi-
ately upon service of the indictment or information in these
jurisdictions. 132 Once served, property owners may attempt to
transfer funds from United States accounts into off shore accounts
such as the Cayman Islands, Bimini Island and the traditional
Swiss Bank Account. 133 The nature and mobility of personal prop-
131. There is also an area of concern when a lis pendens has been filed and the
government has failed to prove its case. In this situation, the Government
should file a lis pendens withdrawal to clear the title. However, this withdrawal
is not always filed and a title searcher should check with the United States
Attorney's Office to see if one exists.
132. One procedure utilized by the government is to send an agent to the bank
with a radio. Once the indictment is filed, the agent is notified and will
immediately seize the account. This practice is in response to the actions of
defendant property owners who pre-arrange transfer processes which can be
quickly initialed with a single phone call.
133. Although the Swiss Bank Account has been the traditional "safe haven"
for illegal funds, the United States and the Swiss Government have signed a
treaty which allows the United States to access Swiss accounts in order to seize
funds. However, this treaty provides that the Swiss Government will receive
50% of the assets if the United States obtains a Final Order. This treaty has led
to a practice by the United States to include a provision in a plea agreement
which forces the property owner to transfer the money back to the United States.
Therefore, the United States seizes 100% of the funds. Even if the United States
provided transportation for the property owner and the agents to Switzerland,
the money saved by not splitting the assets makes this expense economically
prudent. (Agreement Between the United States and Switzerland Relating to the
Treaty of May 25, 1973, on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, November 3,
1993, U.S. - Switz., KAV No. 3708). The United States has also signed treaties
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specifically dealing with forfeitures with Trinidad and Tobago. (Agreement
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago Concerning Maritime Counter-Drug
Operations, March 4, 1996, U.S - Trin. & Tobago, KAV No. 4549), Russia
(Agreement Between the United States and Russia on Cooperation in Criminal
Law Matters, With Annex., June 30, 1995, U.S. - Russia, KAV No. 4518), Hong
Kong (Agreement Between the United States and Hong Kong Extending the
Agreement of Nov. 23, 1990, as Extended, Concerning the Confiscation and
Forfeiture of the Proceeds and Instrumentalities of Drug Trafficking, July 10,
1995, U.S. - H.K., KAV No. 4380); Grenada (Agreement Between the Government
of the United States of America and the Government of Grenada Concerning
Maritime Counter-Drug Operations, May 16, 1995, U.S. - Gren., KAV No. 4249);
St. Lucia (Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of St. Lucia Concerning Maritime Counter-Drug
Operations, April 20, 1995, U.S. - St. Lucia, KAV No. 4240); Antigua and
Barbuda (Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of Antigua and Barbuda Concerning Maritime Counter-
Drug Operations, April 19, 1995, U.S. - Ant. & Barb., KAV 4238); Dominica
(Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Dominica Concerning Maritime Counter-Drug Operations, April
19, 1995, U.S. - Dominica, KAV No. 4239); St. Kitts and Nevis (Agreement
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
St Kitts and Nevis Concerning Maritime Counter-Drug Operations, April 13,
1995, U.S. - St. Chris.-Nevis, KAV No. 4231); Dominican Republic (Agreement
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the Dominican Republic Concerning Maritime Counter-Drug Operations, March
23, 1995, U.S. - Dom. Rep., KAV No. 4213); Canada (Agreement Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada
Regarding the Sharing of Forfeited Assets and Equivalent Funds, March 22,
1995, U.S. - Can., KAV No. 4212); Venezuela (Agreement for Mutual Assistance
in Administration of Justice in Connection with Certain Banking, Financial and
Other Institutions, March 17, 1995, U.S. Venez., KAV No. 4205); Austria (Treaty
with Austria on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, February 23,
1995, U.S. - Aus., S. TREATY Doc. No. 104-21); Hungary (Treaty with Hungary on
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, December 1, 1994, U.S. - Hung., S.
TRATY Doc. No. 104-20); Philippines (Treaty with the Philippines on Mutual
Legal Assistance In Criminal Matters, November 13, 1994, U.S. - Phil., S.
TaREATY Doc. No. 104-18); Paraguay (Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Paraguay to
Cooperate in the Prevention and Control of Money Laundering Arising from
Illegal Trafficking in Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances, November 30,
1993, U.S. - Para., KAV No. 4010); Netherlands (Agreement Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands Regarding Mutual Cooperation in the Tracing,
Freezing, Seizure and Forfeiture of Proceeds and Instrumentalities of Crime and
the Sharing of Forfeited Assets, November 20, 1992, U.S. - Neth., KAV No. 3548);
Republic of Korea (Treaty with The Republic of Korea on Mutual Legal
Assistance in Criminal Matters, November 23, 1993, U.S. - Korea, S. TaATY
Doc. No. 104-1); Belize (Agreement Between the Government of Belize and the
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erty and the issues which arise surrounding the seizure require
the government to identify assets early and to obtain physical
seizure as quickly and quietly as possible.
B. Methods of Seizure
The Government has several methods to seize property.
Before discussing the constitutional issues raised by forfeiture, it
is helpful to understand the methodologies employed by the gov-
ernment when it seizes property.
1. Restraining Order or Injunction
The government may obtain a restraining order or injunction
which will prevent the defendant from transferring the prop-
erty. 134 This court order requires a hearing in which the govern-
ment must show there is a substantial probability that the
Government will prevail on the issue of forfeiture, that failure to
enter the order will result in the property being destroyed or
removed from the jurisdiction, or otherwise made unavailable; 135
and that the need to preserve the availability of the property out-
weighs the hardship on any party against whom the order is
entered. 136 This order will preserve the property for a seizure
probable cause hearing.
Government of the United States of America Concerning Maritime Counter-Drug
Operations, December 23, 1992, U.S. - Belize, KAV No. 3468); Colombia
(Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of the Republic of Colombia, July 24, 1990, U.S. -
Colom., KAV No. 2693); India (Mutual Co-Operation Agreement Between
Government of the United States of America and Government of India for
Reducing Demand, Preventing Illicit Use of and Traffic in Drugs, and for Matters
Relating to Licit Trade in Opiates, Etc., March 29, 1990, U.S. - India, KAV No.
2537); Cartagena (Declaration of Cartagena Concerning the Production of,
Trafficking in and Demand for Illicit Drugs., February 15, 1990, U.S. -
Cartagena, KAV No. 2908); United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland (Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland Concerning the Investigation of Drug Trafficking Offences and the
Seizure and Forfeiture of Proceeds And Instrumentalities of Drug Trafficking,
February 9, 1988, U.S. - U.K. & N. Ir., T.I.A.S. No. 11649).
134. 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)-(2) (1994); 18 U.S.C. §§ 982, 1963(d)(1)-(2) (1994).
135. 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(BXi) (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 982 (1994) (incorporating 21
U.S.C. § 853(e) (1994)); 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1)(B)(i) (1994).
136. 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1XB)(ii) (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 982 (1994) (incorporating
21 U.S.C. § 853(e) (1994)); 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1XBXii) (1994).
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2. Seizure Warrants - Criminal
The government may request the issuance of a warrant
authorizing the seizure of property subject to forfeiture in the
same manner as provided for a search warrant.137 However, this
procedure only applies to money laundering and drug trafficking
statutes. If the government shows probable cause that the prop-
erty to be seized would, in the event of conviction, be subject to
forfeiture and that a restraining order or injunction may not be
sufficient to assure the availability of the property for forfeiture,
the court shall issue a criminal seizure warrant.'3 8
The Fourth Amendment also applies to seizure warrants
since the Constitution specifically protects citizens against unrea-
sonable seizures and warrants unsupported by probable cause. 139
The Supreme Court has consistently held that a "seizure of prop-
erty occurs where there is some meaningful interference with an
individual's possessory interests in that property. " 140 A seizure
warrant is certainly the type of process which the Framers
intended to include in the Fourth Amendment.
3. Administrative Civil Seizure Actions 14 1
The government may also gain title to property through an
administrative forfeiture action. 14 2 These seizures do not involve
assets with a value greater than $500,000.143 However, if the
asset is currency or monetary instruments, then the asset may be
137. 21 U.S.C. § 853(f) (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 982 (1994) (incorporating 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(f) (1994)).
138. 21 U.S.C. 853(f) (1994).
139. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
140. United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). See Horton v. California,
496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987); Maryland v.
Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747-748 (1983)
(Stevens, J., concurring); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91 n. 6 (1980).
141. See 21 C.F.R. § 1316.71 (1984) (incorporating 19 U.S.C. § 1607 (1994),
amended by Pub. L. No. 104-237, 110 Stat. 3099 (1996)).
142. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.77.
143. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.75(a) (1996) (incorporating 19 U.S.C. § 1607 (1994),
amended by Pub. L. No. 104-237, 110 Stat. 3099 (1996)).
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forfeited regardless of its value.""' Property which can be for-
feited under this procedure does not include real property since
Congress has defined property under this section as "a controlled
substance, raw material, product, container, equipment, money or
other asset, vessel, vehicle, or aircraft within the scope of the
Act."145 Administrative forfeiture actions have greatly reduced
the burden upon the Courts, especially when considering the large
number of uncontested forfeiture actions. 146
4. In Rem Civil Forfeiture147
In civil forfeiture, the government may bring an action before,
during, or after a criminal forfeiture action. As explained, this
action is instigated by filing a suit against the property. As a
practical matter, however, when the government is preparing for
a criminal action, it usually does not bring a civil forfeiture action
pre-indictment since it may have to engage in civil discovery and
reveal too much of its criminal case.
Congress expanded civil forfeitures in 1992 to provide original
jurisdiction in any district where the act or omission giving rise to
the forfeiture occurred. 148 Also, a court with jurisdiction may
issue and serve process on a nationwide basis. 49
5. Seizure of Electronic or Computer systems.
With developments in technology, the use of the computer has
become worldwide. The "information age" has caused more and
more activity to be transferred from traditional media to elec-
tronic media. This information includes pornography, drug traf-
ficking records, money laundering records and other illegal
activity. With the broad reaches of the forfeiture statutes, much
of this electronic hardware, specifically computers, can be seized.
144. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.75(a) (incorporating 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(3)(A)-(C)
(1994)). Bank accounts are not monetary instruments or currency under 31
U.S.C. § 5312 and are limited by the $500,000 cap under 19 U.S.C. § 1607 (1994).
145. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.71(c) (1984).
146. See supra note 82.
147. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1994).
148. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1355(b)(1XA) (1994), amended by Pub. L. 102-550 effective
Oct. 28, 1992, section 2 of Pub.L. 102-550, set out as a note under section 5301 of
Title 42.
149. 28 U.S.C. § 1355(d) (1994) (stating "Any court with jurisdiction over a
forfeiture action pursuant to subsection (b) may issue and cause to be served in
any other district such process as may be required to bring before the court the
property that is the subject of the forfeiture action.").
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However, the government is faced with a unique problem when
legal activity is commingled with illegal activity. For example, a
person engaging in child pornography on his computer may also
be running an "on-line" magazine over the Internet. Therefore,
the computer hardware may contain mostly legitimate First
Amendment protected activity but also have illegal material.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits issuance of general war-
rants allowing law enforcement officers to browse through a per-
son's possessions looking for random evidence. 150 A warrant must
particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or
things to be seized. 1 5 1 With today's technology, computer mate-
rial, especially files, can be quickly moved from location to location
and; in many cases, the exact physical location can not be
known. 152 In cases where warrants seek to seize material pre-
sumptively protected by the First Amendment, the level to which
the items to be seized must be particularly described is height-
ened. 153 The United States can not seize material without show-
ing probable cause. The government is presented with a problem
when a computer contains legal material and illegal material,
because probable cause can only be shown for the illegal material.
A case involving the communication of indecent language
occurred in United States v. Maxwell, 5 in military court. In this
case, the defendant had several "user-names" 155 but only con-
ducted illegal activity with one of the names. If the authorities
150. Andersen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976).
151. Id.; United States v. Layne, 43 F.3d 127, 132 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 1722 (1995).
152. The popular "news groups" are contained in an area where files are
uploaded and downloaded without the users knowledge as to whether one, two or
thousands of computers are involved. The computers involved can and are
surrounding the globe. Therefore, knowing the exact location of any one file is
nearly impossible. America On-Line, CompuServe and Internet e-mail generally
store information "on-line" and the exact location of the files are unknown based
upon the large number of computers these providers maintain. In order for the
Government to obtain a search or seizure warrant, it must have specific
knowledge as to the location of the files it wishes to obtain. See A.C.L.U. v. Reno,
929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
153. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731 (1961).
154. 42 M.J. 568 (U.S. Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals 1995).
155. The defendant had at least the names Reddel, Launchboy, and Zirloc.
The warrant was only issued for Reddel, but authorities searched the e-mail
boxes for the other names also. Even though each name was the same defendant,
this example shows one of the potential problems associated with the virtual
world.
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has not known the illegal name, their search and seizure efforts
would have failed.156 This case illustrates one of the many issues
which will develop when the Government attempts to seize elec-
tronic or computer systems.
15 7
C. The Relation Back Doctrine
The relation-back doctrine has been codified in the drug traf-
ficking,1 58 money laundering,'5 9 and sexual exploitation of chil-
dren statutes. 160 This doctrine was recognized as early as 1889 in
a Supreme Court decision, United States v. Stowell. 161 This doc-
trine creates the legal fiction that when the Government gains
title pursuant to a Final Order, this title relates back to the illegal
act. The question becomes what effect does this doctrine have on
transfers which occur between the illegal act and the Final Order,
especially in light of the "innocent owner" defense. The Supreme
Court has recently spoken on this issue in United States v. Parcel
of Land, Buildings, Appurtenances & Improvements, Known as 92
Buena Vista Ave., Rumson, N.J. 162 This case resolved the split
between the circuits in interpreting the relation back doctrine and
allowed the innocent owner defense to be successful even when
the transfer occurs after the illegal act. However, confusion
remains between the circuits, despite 92 Buena Vista Ave.. The
Third Circuit has commented that "92 Buena Vista Ave. raises
considerable doubt as to whether the forfeiture statutes are meant
to reach post-illegal-act transferees who did not know about the
act causing the taint until after it transpired." 63
156. The search and seizure was valid under an exception to the exclusionary
rule since there was no question concerning the user's e-mail address in which
the illegal conduct was associated.
157. Many other issues will develop concerning computer storage of illegal
material and their seizure. However, a full discussion of this specific area is
beyond the scope of this article.
158. 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1994).
159. 18 U.S.C. § 981(f) (1994).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 2254(g) (1994).
161. 133 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1889). This case also prevented the possibility of a post-
illegal act transferee invoking the innocent owner defense, because title to a
defendant's property vests in the government at the time the drug crime occurs.
However, this proposition was specifically rejected in United States v. Parcel of
Land, Buildings, Appurtenances & Improvements, Known as 92 Buena Vista
Ave., Rumson, N.J., 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
162. 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
163. United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, V.I.N. SRH-16266, 43 F.3d 794,
801 (3d Cir. 1994).
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The relation back doctrine also creates problems with record-
ing statutes and title searches. Assuming the Government does
not file a lis pendens, there will be no indication in the land
records office that the property is under investigation for forfei-
ture or even involved in a forfeiture action. This problem occurred
in United States v. Colonial Nations Bank, N.A 164
IV. THE "INNOCENT-OWNER" DEFENSE.
Owners wishing to contest a forfeiture action have primarily
two theories on which to base their defense. First the property
owner may contest the facts. For example, the property owner
may contest that the property was misidentified and the wrong
property was seized. However, for obvious reasons, this theory is
rarely used. The second and more useful defense is the "innocent-
owner" defense. This defense developed in the common-law and
has become codified in modern forfeiture statutes.
The "innocent-owner" defense provides the best protection for
third party owners who have had property seized in connection
with illegal activity. Of all the parties involved, an innocent third
party has the greatest risk of unjust property loss and Constitu-
tional rights infringement. Although this article focuses upon the
culpable property owner, the innocent third party owner is placed
in the most precarious position. The material which follows dis-
cusses the history of this defense, its codification in modern fed-
eral forfeiture statutes, and examples of harsh results against
third parties despite the codification of the defense. 1 65
164. 74 F.3d 486 (4th Cir. 1996). Although this case involved a Bank
purchasing property three months after the Final Order, these facts illustrate
the importance of a lis pendens to any party searching title for purchase, sale or
title insurance. As explained above, the Final Order is recorded in the land
records office and should establish title in the United States. Since the Bank did
not purchase the property until after the Final Order, the Court correctly held
that title did not pass to the Bank since title was vested in the United States by
the Final Order. This case does establish that the lis pendens is not required to
be filed by the United States.
165. Although briefly addressed in this article, many law review articles have
specifically addressed the "innocent owner" defense in relation to forfeiture
statutes. See Michael J. Wietrzychowski, Civil Forfeiture-Protecting Innocent
Donees Under 21 U.S.C. § 881(A) (6)- United States V. 92 Buena Vista Avenue,
937 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1260, and cert. denied sub
nom., Goodwin v. United States, 112 S. CT. 1264 (1992), 65 TEMP. L. REV. 245
(1992); Anthony J. Franze, Casualties of War?: Drugs, Civil Forfeiture, and the
Plight of the " Innocent Owner", 70 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 369 (1994); Damon
Garett Saltzburg, Real Property Forfeitures as a Weapon in the Government's
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A. History of the "Innocent-Owner" Defense and Its Modern
Codification.
The innocent owner defense was recognized in English com-
mon law and was incorporated in this country's common-law. His-
torically, this defense arose in maritime law concerning the
liability of ships when navigated negligently by a pilot. Pilot acts
of the early states required ships in piloted waters to employ or
hire a pilot to steer into port. These statutes required the ship
owners and crew to retain a pilot once they reached port. The
issue arose whether an in rem action arose against the ship when
injury was caused by the ship through the pilot's negligence.'6 6
This defense was also allowed in the earliest forfeiture actions.
When a ship ran a blockage, the ship and its cargo were subject to
forfeiture.167 However, if "the owner stood clear from even a pos-
sible intention of fraud, their property will be excepted from the
penal consequence of the cargo." 6 " From these early cases, this
defense protected the innocent owners.
However, as this defense developed, the common-law innocent
owner defense lost strength. As civil forfeiture developed, it was
generally held that the innocence of the owner was never a
defense since the property was the subject of the action.169 In
War on Drugs: A Failure to Protect Innocent Ownership Rights, 72 B.U. L. REv.
217 (1992); Moshe Heching, Civil Forfeiture and the Innocent Owner Defense:
United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. CT. 1126 (1993), 16 HARv- J.L. . &
PUB. POL'Y 835 (1993); Robert E. Blacher, Clearing the Smoke from the
Battlefield: Understanding Congressional Intent Regarding the Innocent Owner
Provision of 21 U.S.C. § 881 (A)(7), 85 J. CRIM L. & CRMINOLOGY 502 (1994);
Allison A. Cornelius, Civil Forfeiture Under 21 U.S.C. S 881(A)(7): The Problem
of the Innocent Owner Spouse, 39 VIL. L. REV. 1351 (1994); George T. Pappas,
Civil Forfeiture and Drug Proceeds: The Need to Balance Societal Interests With
the Rights of Innocent Owners, 77 MARQ. L. REv. 856 (1994); Alice Marie O'Brien,
"Caught in the Crossfire": Protecting the Innocent Owner of Real Property from
Civil Forfeiture Under 21 U.S.C. S 881(A) (7), 65 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 521 (1991).
166. See The China, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 53 (1868). In The China, a New York law
required ships to employ a pilot to bring ships to the harbor. The pilot assigned
was negligent and caused injury to another brig. Since a pilot must be assigned
under New York law, it was troubling for the court to assign liability under
master servant when the State required the pilot to be on the ship. Therefore,
the Court found that the vessel itself was liable and avoided the agency analysis.
167. See The William Bagaley, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 377 (1866).
168. Id.
169. See Dobbin's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. (6 Otto.) 395 (1877)
(Lessee was in violation of revenue laws which led to forfeiture of real and
personal property of the lessor without regard to the personal misconduct or
responsibility of the owner/lessor.); United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2
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1926, the Supreme Court, in Van Oster v. Kansas170 stated "[i]t
has long been settled that statutory forfeitures of property
intrusted by the innocent owner or lienor to another who uses it in
violation of the revenue laws of the United States is not a violation
of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. " 1 71 Recently,
the Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional right
to the "innocent-owner" defense, 172 thus acknowledging the lim-
ited application of the common-law "innocent-owner."
The diminishing protection of this defense prompted Congress
to codify the "innocent-owner" defense in many of its forfeiture
laws, thereby creating a statutory "innocent-owner" defense. 73
This defense has specifically been added to the drug trafficking
174
and money laundering1 75 statutes. The language in the drug traf-
ficking statutes is "no property shall be forfeited under this para-
graph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any
act or omission established by that owner to have been committed
or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner."' 76
This language has raised several issues: what is an owner, what
constitutes innocence, did Congress mean for the "or" between
"knowledge or consent" to be an "and", and does this only apply to
bone fide purchasers? However, the inclusion of this defense has
made the results under modern forfeiture statutes less harsh to
How.) 210, 238 (1844) (innocence of the owner was fully established); The
Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827) (A conviction for piracy was not a
prerequisite for a proceeding to forfeit a ship engaged in piracy in violation of
federal law.); see also United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1890).
170. 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
171. Id. at 468; see Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. (6 Otto.) 395
(1877); Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921); United States
v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1 (1890).
172. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 997 (1996).
173. Id.
The innocent owner defense does not keep the government from seizing a vessel,
but only allows the owner of the conveyance to prove his innocence later in the
forfeiture proceeding. The House has voted overwhelmingly to support the
innocent owner defense provisions in the bill. To assure consistency in the law,
an additional change needs to be made to the forfeiture laws under title 19,
United States Code. This will ensure that our forfeiture laws are consistent and
that the innocent owner defense will be available in forfeiture cases regardless of
the Federal agency handling the case.
134 CONG. REc. H7704-01 (1988) (statement of Senator Davis).
174. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)-(7) (1994).
175. 18 U.S.C. §981(a)(2) (1994).
176. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1994).
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third party owners. Unfortunately, not all forfeiture statutes
have this defense codified.
1 7 7
In light of the many articles in this area,17 this article will
only briefly address some of these concerns. Generally, courts
have followed a liberal interpretion of "owner" under these stat-
utes and have included anyone with a "legal or equitable interest
in the property seized." 179 Therefore, most property owners are
afforded an opportunity to challenge the forfeiture action.
Until recently, the Circuits have been split as to what "inno-
cent" means. The Fourth Circuit held the rigid view than any
transfer after the illegal act was invalid since the government's
title relates back to this act.180 However, the Supreme Court later
held that the mere fact the transfer occurs after the illegal act
does not bar the assertion of the "innocent owner" defense.' s ' The
Supreme Court held that even though title relates back to the ille-
gal act, the property does not belong to the government until the
Final Order. This holding stresses the need for the Government to
take advantage of such tools as lis pendens, restraining orders,
injunctions and seizure warrants to protect the property between
the time the action is filed and the Final Order. In addressing the
statutory construction of the "and" versus "or" debate, Congres-
sional intention seems to require the "and" conjunction.' 8 2 The
split remains among the circuits.18 3
177. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. 994.
178. See supra note 164.
179. United States v. One Single Family Residence Located at 15603 85th Ave.
N., Lake Park, Palm Beach County, Fla., 933 F.2d 976, 981 (11th Cir. 1991).
180. In the Case of One 1985 Nissan, 300ZX, VIN: JN1C214SFX069854, 889
F.2d 1317 (4th Cir. 1989).
181. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126.
182. "It is intended that, in order to establish the innocent owner exemption,
the property owner must establish all three circumstances-i.e., that the owner
lacked knowledge, consent, and willful blindness as to the offense giving rise to
forfeiture." United States v. Parcel of Real Property Known as 6109 Grub Rd.,
886 F. 2d 618 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that by using the word "or" in 21 U.S.C.
881(a)(7) (1994) Congress intended to give the owner the choice of proving either
lack of knowledge or lack of consent). 136 CONG. REC. S6586-01, S6605-06
(1990).
183. The following are circuit court interpretations which imply a conjunctive
Reading: United States v. One Parcel of Property Located at 121 Allen Place,
Hartford, Conn.,, 75 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Nineteen and
Twenty-Five Castle St., 31 F.3d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. 890 Noyac
Rd., 945 F.2d 1252, 1255 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Land Known as Lot 111-
B, 902 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. 15603 85th Ave., 933
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B. The Effect of Asset Forfeiture upon Third Party Property
Owners.
The effect upon the innocent third party owner can be dra-
matic. In the prohibition, it was common for a court to allow for-
feiture of a car used to transport moonshine in the prohibition-era
by a person to whom the third party owner had entrusted the car
even when the owner had no knowledge that the culpable party
would violate the law.1
8 4
In one case, a $20,000 yacht was seized because marijuana
was found on board.185 The yacht was leased by two Puerto Rico
residents and the third party innocent owner was the yacht's leas-
ing company. 186 The yacht was forfeited.' 8 7 The leasing company
only found out about the forfeiture when the lessee's defaulted on
their lease payments. 1
88
In another case, a car was forfeited when a man engaged in
criminal sexual behavior with a prostitute. 8 9 Despite acknowl-
edging that the wife did not have any knowledge that her husband
had used their jointly owned automobile in illegal activity, the
Supreme Court permitted the forfeiture. 190
The following scenarios portray the dramatic effect of asset
forfeiture on innocent third party owners:
(1) Just ask Willie Jones, owner of a Nashville landscaping
business. In 1991, he made the mistake of paying for an airplane
ticket in cash-behavior that was deemed to fit a drug courier pro-
file. Mr. Jones was detained and his luggage searched. No drugs
were found. But his wallet contained $9,600 in cash. The money
F.2d 976, 981 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. 4492 South Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d
1258, 1267 (2d Cir. 1989).
The following are circuit court interpretations which imply a disjunctive reading:
United States v. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d 1496, 1503 (11th Cir. 1992)
(the Eleventh Circuit has determined both readings apply with the disjunctive
reading being the latest decision); United States v. Certain Real Property and
Premises, Known as 890 Noyac Rd., Noyac, N.Y., 945 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1991);
United States v. 14 1st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 877-80 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1109 (1991); United States v. One 107.9 Acre Parcel of Land, 898 F.2d
396, 398 (3d Cir. 1990); Grubb Rd., 886 F. 2d 618 (1989).
184. Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
185. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 997 (1996).
190. Id.
560 [Vol. 19:527
34
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 9
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/9
ASSET FORFEITURE
was seized, but Mr. Jones was not charged with any crime. After
two years of legal wrangling, his money was finally returned."191
(2) In 1989, during a fruitless seven hour search for drugs
aboard Craig Kline's new $24,000 sailboat, Federal agents wield-
ing axes, power drills and crowbars nearly destroyed the boat. No
evidence of contraband was found. The boat was sold for scrap,
and only after Congress intervened did Mr. Kline receive a reim-
bursement of $9,100 - a third of the boat's value. 19 2
(3) Over the course of several years, Florida police routinely
confiscated cash (an estimate $8 million total) from hundreds of
motorists who supposedly fit profiles of drug couriers. Criminal
charges were rarely filed in these cases, and in only three
instances did the individuals successfully have funds returned. 193
Although these are the unusual cases, they illustrate the
sever impact of asset forfeiture upon third parties and show how
the "innocent-owner" defense does not afford the protection one
might expect.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
The Constitutional challenges against asset forfeiture, espe-
cially civil forfeiture, have largely been unsuccessful. Congress
has made it clear that in balancing the need to fight the war on
crime, Constitutional rights may take a back-seat. 194 Congress
has stated that
[tihe severity of our society's drug abuse problem is painfully
obvious. Each and every day illegal drugs are cited as a root cause
of most of our nation's serious crime statistics. The problem of
191. News Committee on the Judiciary, Statements concerning H.R. 1916 By
The Honorable Henry J. Hyde, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (F.D.C.H. 1996).
192. Id.
193. Id. Note that neither the number of contested forfeitures, nor the
culpability of the property owners is provided by this statute.
194. Congress has been advised of the problems with asset forfeiture, both for
recent and previous lesgislation. See Current Federal Asset Seizure and
Forfeiture Program: Hearing on H.R. 1916 Before the United States House
Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1996) (written statements of
E.E. Edwards, III, David B. Smith, and Richard J. Troberman co-chairs National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers Asset Forfeiture Abuse Task Force);
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 3315 Before
the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice,
102th Cong. 1st Sess. (1994) (statement of Rep. Henry Hyde); Crime Prevention
and Criminal Justice Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 3315 Before the House
Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice, 102th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1994) (statement of Laura Murphy Lee Director of the A.C.L.U.)
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drug abuse is so deeply ingrained in the daily activities of so many
people that efforts to lessen the use of dangerous drugs have to be
comprehensive and far reaching. 1
95
As this article will explain, when balancing constitutional
rights against the need to combat crime, the constitutional rights
side has been the side outweighed by the need to fight crime.
Although forfeiture is targeted toward illegal activity, the current
statutes of this area allow the principals that this country was
founded upon, the Constitution, to be cast aside.
A. Due Process and Notice of Seizure9 '
In 1972, the Supreme Court stated that "[fior more than a
century the centrla [sic] meaning of procedural due process has
been clear: 'Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to
be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must
first be notified.'" 197 The Court went on to state that "It is equally
fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to be
heard 'must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.'" 198  These concepts are deeply rooting in American
Jurisprudence. However, modern in rem forfeiture' 99 does not
require notice before personal property can be seized and has only
195. H.R. REP. No. 446, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
196. In discussing whether notice is required before seizure, it is helpful to
understand the three basic categories of property which can be seized. The first
category is contraband, which is the illegal material itself. This category
includes property such as drugs, drug manufacturing equipment, and counterfeit
money printing plates. The second category is proceeds from illegal activity,
such as a house purchased with drug money or a car purchased with laundered
money. These two types of property present the least constitutional problems
since they cannot be legally owned at all. However, the third category is property
which is used in furtherance of illegal activity such as a house where drugs are
sold, a legitimate business which is also used to launder money or a computer
which contains financial records of illegal activity as well as other legal material.
The property in this third category presents the most constitutional problems
since the property is used for legal and illegal purposes. This third category of
property is the focus of the following discussion on whether due process requires
notice and a hearing before the government can seize property.
197. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972). See Grannis v. Oredean, 234
U.S. 385 (1914); Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897); Windsor v. McVeigh, 93
U.S. 274 (1876); Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863).
198. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972).
199. As previously discussed, FED. R. C~mw. P 7(c)(2) requires that criminal
forfeiture be included in the indictment or information and therefore notice is
given to the defendant of the forfeiture action. Accordingly, this section is only
concerned with civil forfeiture actions.
562 [Vol. 19:527
36
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 9
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/9
ASSET FORFETURE6
recently required notice for the seizure of real property.2 °° In
Fuentes, the Court established the general rule that all property
seizures require notice and an opportunity to be heard. However,
the Court noted that notice and a hearing could be postponed if
"extraordinary situations" existed to justified postponement.201
The Court used the three factors stated in Mathews v. Eldridge20 2
to determined whether "extraordinary" circumstances exists.
These factors are: the nature of the "private interest" at stake; the
risk of error associated with the procedure used; and the United
State's interest, including the administrative burden, if a more
elaborate procedure is used.20 3 From these factors, the exception
has expanded to cover most, if not all, personal property.20 4 As
discussed, the movable and readily concealable nature of personal
property creates the situation that supports the traditional reason
for seizing personal property - to insure that the court retains
jurisdiction2 5 - therefore, placing most all personal property
under this exception. In interpreting Calero-Toledo, the Eleventh
Circuit stated "it is well settled that no prior judicial determina-
tion that seizure is justified is required when the government
seizes items subject to forfeiture."20 6 This interpretation is shared
by several other courts. 2 07 Additionally, Congress amended the
200. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
201. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90.
202. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
203. Id. at 335.
204. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). (stating
that where the government's interest in immediate seizure of a yacht subject to
civil forfeiture justified dispensing with the usual requirement of prior notice and
hearing. The Court based its ruling on two essential considerations: first,
immediate seizure was necessary to establish the Court's jurisdiction over the
property; and second, the yacht might have disappeared had the Government
given advance warning of the forfeiture action). See also United States v. Von
Neumann, 474 U.S. 242, 251 (1986) (stating that no preseizure hearing is
required when customs officials seize an automobile at the border).
205. James Daniel Good, 114 S. Ct. at 502.
206. United States v. A Single Family Residence and Real Property Located at
900 Rio Vista Blvd., Ft. Lauderdale, 803 F.2d 625, 632 (11th Cir. 1986); see
United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty Dollars in United
States Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 562 n.12 (1983); United States v. Kemp, 690 F.2d
397 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. One 1975 Pontiac Lemans, Vehicle I.D. No.
2F37M56101227, 621 F.2d 444 (1st Cir. 1980).
207. United States v. Premises and Real Property At 4492 South Livonia Rd.,
Livonia, N.Y., 667 F. Supp. 79 (W.D.N.Y. 1987); United States v. 678 Acres of
Land, More or Less In Mecklenburg County, N.C., 671 F. Supp. 413 (W.D.N.C.
1987).
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drug trafficking2 0 8 and money laundering2 0 9 civil forfeiture sec-
tions so they now state that actual notice of the impending forfei-
ture is unnecessary when the government cannot identify any
party with an interest in the seized article,210 and that property is
subject to forfeiture through a summary administrative procedure
if no party files a claim.21 '
Under this interpretation, the government is allowed to seize
real and personal property without notice to the property owners.
The government would hold an ex parte hearing in front of a mag-
istrate and obtain a seizure warrant without notice to the prop-
erty owner or an adversary proceeding.212 However, in 1993, the
Supreme Court held that absent exigent circumstances, the gov-
ernment is required to afford notice and meaningful opportunity
to be heard before seizing real property under civil forfeiture.2 13
This holding is based upon the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause 214 and specifically the Mathews factors. 21 5 The Court lim-
ited its holding in James Daniel Good (to real property) by stating
"t]he constitutional limitations we enforce in this case apply to
real property.... 2 16 The general rule developed that the govern-
ment must afford notice and a hearing to a real property owner
208. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1994).
209. 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1994).
210. 19 U.S.C. § 1607 (1994).
211. 19 U.S.C. § 1609 (1994); see United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135
(1996).
212. Id.
213. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
214. "[n]o person shall . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law." U.S. CoNST. amend V.
215. (1) consideration of the private interest affected by the official action; (2)
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used,
as well as the probable value of additional safeguards; (3) and the Government's
interest, including the administrative burden that additional procedural
requirements would impose. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
216. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. at 61 (1993). Although
Justice Kennedy states the general rule that "individuals must receive notice
and an opportunity to be heard before the Government deprives them of
property", James Daniel Good, 114 S. Ct. at 498. See United States v. Eight
Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty Dollars in United States Currency, 461 U.S.
555, 562, n.12 (1983); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82, reh'g denied, 409 U.S.
902 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 342
(1969); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950);
see also Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 679. However, the Good decision was based
upon Calero-Toledo, which was decided before real property was subject to
forfeiture under the drug trafficking statutes.
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before executing a seizure warrant. 2 17 However, an exception
exists when the government can show that an extraordinary situ-
ation is present which justifies postponement of notice and a hear-
ing.21s To establish "exigent circumstances" the government must
show that less restrictive measures 219 would not suffice to protect
the United States' interest in preventing the sale, destruction, or
continued unlawful use of the real property.220 Again, this hold-
ing does not have any application to personal property.
In balancing the necessity to seize assets in the war on crime
against the due process right to notice, the Supreme Court has
sacrificed constitutional rights in order to better arm this coun-
try's law enforcement. Even though the classification of property
as personal seems to exempt seizure from the due process require-
ment of notice, real property is at least afforded some constitu-
tional protection.22 1
B. Double Jeopardy222
The practice of instigating criminal and civil forfeiture actions
against the same party has produced a multitude of double jeop-
ardy challenges.22 3 This practice creates a "double edged sword"
which the government can wield in the war on crime.224 Recently,
217. James Daniel Good, 114 S. Ct. at 501.
218. Id. See supra note 163.
219. Such less restrictive measures include lis pendens, restraining order, or
bond. James Daniel Good, 519 U.S. at 62.
220. Id. at 505.
221. The dissent in James Daniel Good does express some concern that the
classification of property should not turn the decision. The Framers were more
concerned with the rights of the United States citizens rather than the
classification of property interests. United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Property, 510 U.S. 43, 75 (1993).
222. Although the Fifth Amendment text mentions only harms to "life or limb,"
it is well settled that the Amendment covers imprisonment and monetary
penalties. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989); Ex parte Lange, 85
U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
223. Over 250 cases in the federal system exist dealing with forfeiture and
double jeopardy at the time of this writing.
224. Even when the United States fails to get a conviction based upon a
criminal forfeiture, the civil forfeiture action can still be instigated. The United
States can and has seized property involved in conduct which the property owner
has been acquitted. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S.
354 (1984) (stating that a gun owner's acquittal on criminal charges involving
firearms does not preclude a subsequent in rem forfeiture proceeding against
those firearms under the Gun Control Act); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and
One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235-37 (1972) (finding no double
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the Supreme Court has spoken on this issue and held that
"[u]nless the forfeiture sanction was intended as punishment, so
that the proceeding is essentially criminal in character, the
Double Jeopardy Clause is not applicable."22 5 The Court went on
to determine that the civil forfeiture provided for under the drug
statutes and money laundering statutes was not punishment and
therefore not barred by Double Jeopardy.226
In discussing the Court's recent decision in United States v.
Ursery,227 it is helpful to review Helvering v. Mitchell,228 which
was decided in 1938. In Helvering,229 the Supreme Court
addressed whether a civil penalty for tax deficiency when the
defendant was acquitted on the charge of intentional tax evasion
violated double jeopardy. In finding no violation, the Court held
"that acquittal on a criminal charge is not a bar to a civil action by
the government, remedial in its nature, arising out of the same
facts on which the criminal proceeding was based has long been
settled."23
0
However, in 1989, the Supreme Court blurred the distinction
between civil and criminal penalties in United States v. Halper.231
The Court stated "the labels 'criminal' and 'civil' are not of para-
mount importance. It is commonly understood that civil proceed-
ings may advance punitive as well as remedial goals, and,
conversely, that both punitive and remedial goals may be served
jeopardy bar on a forfeiture of illegally imported jewels under 19 U.S.C. § 1497
(1994), after the owner had been acquitted on criminal charges); United States v.
One 1953 Oldsmobile 98 4 Door Sedan, Motor Number R257687, 222 F.2d 668
(4th Cir. 1955) (stating that the acquittal in criminal action of a driver of an
automobile for acts specifically alleged as grounds for forfeiture of the automobile
in the libel proceeding did not constitute a bar to a civil forfeiture proceeding of
the automobile in which the claimant was not the driver but the titled owner of
the automobile); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) (holding that
recovery of the civil penalty by the Government was not barred by the acquittal
of the defendant in the criminal case and that the doctrines of res judicata and
double jeopardy were not applicable).
225. United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2141-2142 (1996).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
229. Id. at 397.
230. Id.; see Murphy v. United States, 272 U.S. 630, 631 (1926); Stone v.
United States, 167 U.S. 178, 188 (1879); compare Chantangco v. Abaroa, 218
U.S. 476, 481 (1910).
231. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
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by criminal penalties."282 The Halper Court determined that a
civil penalty of $130,000, in light of the $595 violation of the
defendant, was sufficiently disproportionate to constitute a second
punishment in violation of double jeopardy.233 This holding led
many to believe that the possibility of forfeiture under the drug
trafficking and money laundering statutes could be found to be so
disproportionate as to constitute a second penalty.
In Austin v. United States,2 3 4 the Supreme Court added
weight to this belief and held that "the Excessive Fines Clause of
the Eighth Amendment applies to forfeitures of property under
[the drug statutes]."235 Therefore, if the civil forfeiture violated
the Eighth Amendment, the forfeiture could be called a penalty
and double jeopardy protection would exist. In 1994, the Supreme
Court merged these two concepts when it decided in Department
of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch.23 6 that since the tax
assessment involved "not only hinges on the commission of a
crime, it also is exacted only after the taxpayer has been arrested
for the precise conduct that gives rise to the tax obligation in the
first place."237 Thus, the tax was punishment and not revenue
raising in nature. Therefore, the tax was fairly characterized as
punishment.2 38
In reviewing these cases in light of the legislative history of
the drug and money laundering statutes, it would appear that
congressional intent was to provide, at least in part, punishment.
Therefore civil forfeiture following an acquittal in a criminal
charge should be barred by double jeopardy.239 However, the
Supreme Court held otherwise.240
232. Id. at 447
233. Id. at 452.
234. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
235. Id. at 604.
236. 511 U.S. 767 (1994).
237. Id. at 1947.
238. Id. at 1948.
239. See 135 CoNG. REc. S12622-01 (1989) (statement of Senator Biden)
(stating that the Attorney General is to share the proceeds of any civil or
criminal forfeiture with any state or local law enforcement agency that
participated in the forfeiture to help defer the cost of law enforcement); 132
CONG. REC. S4286-02 (1986) and 132 CONG. REc. H1912-02 (1986) (amending 21
U.S.C. § 881 because the current forfeiture authority is an inadequate tool
against money laundering thus indicating stiffer punishment to further deter
money laundering). Typical of the Congressional Record, the discussions of
Congress can be interpreted to illustrate several different intentions.
240. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2141.
19971 7
41
Kim: Asset Forfeiture: Giving up Your Constitutional Rights
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1997
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
In 1995, the Sixth Circuit decided United States v. Ursery24 1
and recognized the decision in Halper that a defendant who
already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be
subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the sec-
ond sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial.24 2 The
second sanction would be punishment under the analysis for
Double Jeopardy if its only characteristics were as a deterrence or
retribution.24 3 By following the reasoning of Halper through
Kurth Ranch the Sixth Circuit found that the civil forfeiture judg-
ment followed by his criminal conviction constituted Double Jeop-
ardy.2 4 4 The Sixth Circuit also recognized the Ninth Circuits
decision in United States v. 405,089.23 U.S. Currency245 which
concluded that civil forfeiture constituted "punishment" and thus
triggered protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause.246 The Sixth
Circuit did, however, criticize the Ninth Circuit's analysis as too
rigid.24 7
The Supreme Court consolidated the Sixth and Ninth Circuit
cases in United States v. Ursery24 s and held that for Double Jeop-
ardy to be invoked, the defendant must meet the test developed in
United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms.249 The Court
first found that there was little doubt that Congress intended pro-
ceedings under drug trafficking and money laundering to be civil,
since those statutes' procedural enforcement mechanisms are
themselves distinctly civil in nature. 25 0 The Court then found
that there was little evidence, much less the "clearest proof' that
the Court requires, suggesting that forfeiture proceedings under
241. 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995).
242. Id. at 573.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 576.
245. 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994). This case involved the United States
seeking civil forfeiture following a criminal conviction.
246. Ursery, 59 F.3d at 575 (citing United States v. $405,089.23 U.S.
Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994)).
247. Ursery, 59 F.3d at 575. The Sixth Circuit believed the Ninth Circuit
suggested that parallel civil forfeiture and criminal proceeding always violated
the Double Jeopardy Clause) Id. (citing United States v. $405,089.23 U.S.
Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994)). In fact, the Sixth Circuit specifically
stated that "a forfeiture case and a criminal prosecution would constitute the
same proceeding only if they were brought in the same indictment and tried at
the same time". Ursery, 59 F.3d at 571.
248. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
249. 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
250. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2149.
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those sections are so punitive in form and effect as to render them
criminal despite Congress' intent to the contrary.25 '
The Supreme Court made a clear statement that the civil for-
feiture provisions of drug trafficking and money laundering are
neither "punishment" nor "criminal" for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause.252 Although the tests exist under Halper to
determine whether double jeopardy protects from subsequent civil
forfeiture, the pressing need to fight the war on crime has again
tipped the scales against constitutional rights and left little mean-
ing to the Halper test.25
3
C. Excessive Fines
The Supreme Court has held the Excessive Fines clause of the
Eighth Amendment applies to civil forfeitures under the drug and
money laundering statutes.254 The Supreme Court has left to the
lower courts to determine whether a specific forfeiture action is
excessive.255 The Court rejected a proportionality test, reasoning
that if "the constitution allows in rem forfeiture to be visited upon
innocent owners... the constitution hardly requires proportional-
ity review of forfeitures."2 56
In determining whether the Eighth Amendment applies, the
Court focused not upon whether forfeiture under the drug stat-
utes 257 were civil or criminal, but rather whether forfeiture is pun-
ishment.258 Although the Supreme Court has held forfeiture is
not "punishment" as to double jeopardy, it stated in Austin that
nothing in the drug trafficking or money laundering statutes or
their legislative history exists to contradict the historical under-
standing of forfeiture as punishment.2 59 The Court quoted the
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. The Supreme Court has effectively reversed previously holdings which
stated that statutory in rem forfeiture imposes punishment. Peisch v. Ware, 8
U.S. (4 Cranch) 347 (1808).
254. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 604 (1993).
255. Id. at 603.
256. Id. at 606; see United States v. Tax Lot 1500, 861 F.2d 232, 234 (9th Cir.
1988); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
257. 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4), (7) (1994).
258. Austin, 509 U.S. at 610.
259. Id. at 619.
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legislative history of the drug statutes in support of the proposi-
tion that forfeiture is a form of punishment.2 6 °
After deciding Austin the Fourth Circuit had an opportunity
to determine whether a forfeiture was excessive under the Eighth
Amendment in United States v. Chandler.26 ' In Chandler, the
Fourth Circuit held that forfeiture of a 33-acre farm was not
excessive even though the illegal activity could only be shown to
have been conducted in the house situated on this property. 262
The court adopted a three part test to determine whether in rem
forfeiture violates the Eighth Amendment and stated that lower
courts must first consider the nexus between the property and the
2632641noffense,2 63 the role and culpability of the property owner, and
the possibility of separating offending property from the remain-
der. 265 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit has adopted the view that
the "question of excessiveness is thus tied to the guilt of the prop-
erty or the extent to which the property was involved in the
offense, and not its value."2 6 6
Regardless of the holding in Austin, several Circuits have
adopted a proportionality test for reviewing forfeiture.26 7 The
Fourth Circuit correctly held the principle of proportionality in the
Eighth Amendment has been associated with the Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishment Clause, rather than the Excessive Fines
Clause,26 8 emphasizing its adoption of an instrumentality test. 2 6 9
260. Id. When it added subsection (a)(7) to § 881 in 1984, Congress recognized
"that the traditional criminal sanctions of fine and imprisonment are inadequate
to deter or punish the enormously profitable trade in dangerous drugs." S. RE.
No. 98-225, p. 191 (1983).
261. 36 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1994).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. This element of the test has led to a practice of portioning land into
small sections in order to prevent to entire forfeiture of property. For example,
had Chandler portioned his land, the severability may have bolstered his
excessive fine challenge and perhaps only subjected a much smaller portion of his
property to forfeiture.
266. Id. at 364.
267. See United States v. R.R. # 1, 14 F.3d 864, 874-75 (3d Cir. 1994); United
States v. One Parcel of Real Property, Located at 9638 Chicago Heights, 27 F.3d
327, 330-31 (8th Cir. 1994) (expressing, obiter, dissatisfaction with a pure
instrumentality).
268. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366-67 (1910).
269. The Fourth Circuit was expressly joined by the Second Circuit in United
States v. Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1995).
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Even though constitutional protection exists, the factual
determinations that forfeiture is excessive in a particular case
may be difficult to find in light of the theory that the question of
excessiveness is tied to the guilt of the property and not the guilt
of the property owner.270
D. Self-Incrimination
In Boyd v. United States,271 the Supreme Court made it clear,
that forfeiture pursuant to an offense committed by a property
owner, though civil in form, is criminal for Fifth Amendment pur-
poses and the defendant will be protected from self-incrimina-
tion.272 However, this principal presents a great difficulty to the
property owner.
This difficulty is best illustrated by the Sixth Circuit case,
United States v. Certain Real Property 566 Hendrickson
Boulevard, Clawson, Oakland County, Michigan.27 In this case,
the Court found that the Government had met its burden of show-
ing probable cause that the defendant's house should be forfeited.
Therefore, the defendant bore the burden of showing the house
was not subject to forfeiture. However, the defendant also had
criminal proceedings based upon the same facts and occurrences.
The defendant alleged that any attempt by him to depose his wife,
children, or his associate, or to obtain their affidavits to challenge
the civil forfeiture would have effectively waived his right against
self-incrimination. 274 The defendant was faced with the choice to
remain silent and allow the forfeiture or testify against the forfei-
tability of his property and expose himself to incriminating admis-
270. See United States v. Real Property Located at 24124 Lemay Street, West
Hills, Ca., 857 F. Supp. 1373 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (home owner was convicted and
sentenced to three years in prison as well as forfeiture of his $195,000 home);
United States v. $288,930.00 In U.S. Currency, 838 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(property illegally aquired and possessed was not punishment and therefore the
Eighth Amendment does not apply); see contra United States v. Real Property
Located at 6625 Zumirez Drive, Malibu, Ca., 845 F. Supp. 725 (C.D. Cal. 1994)
(property owner's house was forfeited when son was selling narcotics from home
even though property owner was aquitted, motion to reverse forfeiture was
granted).
271. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
272. Id. at 634; see One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693,
700 (1965).
273. 986 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1993).
274. Id. at 996.
1997]
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sions.275  Effectively, this dilemma removes his right to self-
incrimination if he wishes to keep his property. This apparent
violation of a constitutional right, has largely been downplayed.
As the Sixth Circuit explained, "[t]his does not mean, however,
that the forfeiture action should be barred because there is a pos-
sibility the claimant will be disadvantaged by remaining
silent."2
76
Although, this situation does infringe upon the constitutional
rights of a claimant, he does have at least one remedy. The claim-
ant can ask the court to stay the civil forfeiture action pending the
resolution of the criminal proceedings.2 77 Nevertheless, the
importancd of winning the war on crime has again outweighed the
protection of the Constitution.
E. Sixth Amendment 278
The process used in seizure creates a unique timing problem
for defending property owners. As we have seen, the notice and
opportunity to a hearing can be postponed most, if not all the time,
in cases involving personal property.2 79 This personal property
also involves funds, meaning the government can seize funds
needed to provide for a defense against the forfeiture. The defend-
275. Id.
276. Id.; see United States v. Certain Real Property Commonly Known as 6250
Ledge Road, Egg Harbor, WI, 943 F.2d 721, 729 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v.
$250,000 in United States Currency, 808 F.2d 895, 900-01 (1st Cir. 1987). It is
interesting that the Sixth Circuit's stated the loss of a Constitutional right is a
mere disadvantage.
277. United States v. United States Currency, 626 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1980).
278. Understandably the United States Attorneys Office has taken a strong
view, understandably, that seizure does not violate the right to counsel:
Moreover, in the absence of a restraining order, the inability to retain counsel
when forfeiture is alleged is due solely to counsel's desire to be guaranteed
payment of his/her fee. In this regard, the third party forfeiture provisions are
not unlike other economic limitations. They mean only that the government's
claim to forfeitable assets is superior to any other claims arising after
commission of the offense, including counsel's claim to a fee. This does not
interfere with a defendant's ability to retain counsel any more than a prior
mortgage or tax lien which may encumber a defendant's assets. If counsel
refuses to represent a prospective client because he/she believes that the client
does not have the financial ability to pay as a result of these prior encumbrances
there is no interference with the right to counsel of choice. Likewise, the
forfeiture provisions do not impermissibly deny a defendant his/her counsel of
choice.
U.S. ATTys. MAN. 9-111.220 n.1 (1990).
279. See supra part V.A.
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ing property owner is asked to rebut the presumption that the
property is forfeitable in a civil action2 0 or to prepare a defense in
a criminal action without the availability of monetary assets.28 '
This dilemma is heightened since in civil forfeiture, the defendant
is not allowed a court appointed attorney.28 2 The Sixth Amend-
ment requires the appointment of counsel in every trial for a seri-
2813ous crime, but according to the courts, civil forfeiture is not a
criminal matter.28 4
The criminal defendant whose assets have been seized via
civil forfeiture is deprived of a significant interest just as if the
assets were restrained pursuant to criminal forfeiture. However,
if the defendant successfully rebuts the government's showing of
probable cause and the government does not to bring forth addi-
tional evidence, due process requires that sufficient assets be
released to pay a defense attorney's reasonable fees.28 5
The legislative history indicates that Congress explicitly
rejected the idea that attorney fees are exempt from forfeiture.
280. Even when the defendant rebuts the government's showing of probable
cause, the government may introduce more evidence to bolster its case and
further prevent the defendant from accessing funds. The most serious
infrigment on this Constitutional right is when the defendant has comingled
legal and illegal funds. The government seizes these funds and the defendant
must carry the burden to defend legal funds without their use. Additionally, this
burden creates Fifth Amendment issues for the defendant.
281. Accord United States v. Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637, 646 (4th Cir.
1988); United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 725 (7th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1505 (10th Cir. 1988); see contra United States
v. Unit No. 7 and Unit No. 8 of Shop in the Grove Condominium, 853 F.2d 1445,
1450-1452 (8th Cir. 1988), mandate stayed by United States v. Unit No. 7 and
No. 8, 864 F.2d 1421 (8th Cir. 1988) (Sixth Amendment requires exemption of
assets sufficient to compensate counsel of choice); United States v. Monsanto, 852
F.2d 1400, 1402-04 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. granted, United States v.
Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988) (Sixth Amendment requires exemption of
attorneys fees from pretrial restraints and forfeiture).
282. United States v. Doe, 743 F.2d 1033, 1038 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating that
"only offenses where a sentence of imprisonment is imposed give the defendant a
right to appointed counsel").
283. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
284. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1994). The "full panoply of constitutional
protections afforded criminal defendants is not available in the context of such
forfeiture proceedings." United States v. One 1982 Chevrolet Crew-Cab Truck
Vin LGCHK33M9C143129, 810 F.2d 178, 183 (8th Cir. 1987). However, this
proposition does not lie well with the holding that civil forfeitures are criminal
for Fifth Amendment purposes.
285. United States v. Michelle's Lounge, 39 F.3d 684, 697-98 (7th Cir. 1994);
See United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186 (2d Cir. 1991).
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Congress cited with approval United States v. Long, 28 6 when it
stated that "holding that property derived from a violation of 21
U.S.C. § 848 remained subject to criminal forfeiture although
transferred to the defendant's attorneys more than six months
prior to conviction. Additionally, an order restraining the attor-
ney from transferring or selling the property was properly
entered."28 7
Courts have stated that the exemption of attorney fees would
substantially undermine the purpose of the third party forfeiture
provisions. As the district court in In Re Grand Jury Subpoena,25 8
stated:
[flees paid to attorneys cannot become a safe harbor from forfei-
ture of the profits of illegal enterprises. In the same manner that
a defendant cannot obtain a Rolls-Royce with the fruits of a crime,
he cannot be permitted to obtain the services of the Rolls-Royce of
attorneys from these same tainted finds.... To permit this would
undermine the purpose of forfeiture statutes, which is to strip
offenders and organizations of their economic power."289
Therefore, forfeiture of an asset given to counsel as payment
of legal fees may be pursued by the government. The money paid
can be sought by the government as long as the government can
prove probable cause. 2 90 The current status of seizure creates a
tremendous disadvantage to,. a defendant. Government argues
that this is simply the same problem when the defendant has sub-
stantial debt and a large mortgage upon his home. However,
those specific financial burdens were self-created and not imposed
by the mere showing of probable cause. Once again, the need to
seize assets has outweighed constitutional rights.
286. 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981).
287. COmPRERENSVE CRME CONTROL AcT OF 1983, S. Rep. No. 225, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 209, n.579 (1983) (citing United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 1186
(2d Cir. 1981).
288. 605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d
Cir. 1985).
289. Id.
290. See Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186; Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United
States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989); Unit No. 7 & 8, 853 F.2d 1445 (8th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Lot 5, Fox Grove, Alachua County, Fla., 23 F.3d 359 (11th Cir.
1994) (citing Monsanto favorably); United States v. McKinney, 915 F.2d 916 (4th
Cir. 1990) (citing Monsanto favorably); Fed. Trade Comm'n. v. World Wide
Factors, Ltd., 882 F.2d 344 (9th Cir. 1989).
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F. First Amendment - Freedom of Speech
When a defendant engages in First Amendment protected
activity and illegal activity, issues arise concerning whether the
seizure of the property can be constitutionally performed. Such
issues were raised in the Supreme Court case of Fort Wayne
Books, Inc. v. Indiana,29 1 where two adult bookstore operators
were charged with violating a state RICO statute. Accordingly, an
injunctive order providing for padlocking of stores and seizure of
the contents was issued. The defendants argued that the seizure
violated the First Amendment since applying RICO's forfeiture
provisions to businesses dealing in protected materials may have
an improper "chilling" effect on free expression by deterring others
from engaging in protected speech. The Supreme Court recog-
nized this argument in Alexander v. United States,2 92 by stating
"[n]o doubt the monetarily large forfeiture in this case may induce
cautious booksellers to practice self-censorship and remove mar-
ginally protected materials from their shelves out of the fear that
those materials could be found obscene and thus subject them to
forfeiture."293 However, the Alexander Court found Fort Wayne
dispositive and held that the deterrence of the sale of obscene
materials is a legitimate end of state antiobscenity laws, and our
cases have long recognized the practical reality that 'any form of
criminal obscenity statute applicable to a bookseller will induce
some tendency to self-censorship and have some inhibitory effect
on the dissemination of material not obscene." 294 For obscene
material, it seems well settled that the First Amendment will not
protect a property owner from forfeiture. 95 Based upon the above
examples, it is doubtful that the First Amendment will offer much,
if any, protection against asset forfeiture.
291. 489 U.S. 46 (1989).
292. 509 U.S. 544 (1993).
293. Id. at 555-56.
294. Id. at 556 (quoting, Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959)).
295. See Action For Children's Television v. Federal Communications Comm'n,
59 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Adult Video Ass'n v. Reno, 41 F.3d 503 (9th Cir.
1994); Adult Video Ass'n v. Barr, 960 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Pryba, 900 F.2d 748 (4th Cir. 1990); Sequoia Books, Inc v. Ingemunson, 901 F.2d
630 (7th Cir. 1990).
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G. Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation296
Given the failed Constitutional challenges discussed above,
the property owner may be offered protection under the Taking
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Although there are few cases
concerning forfeiture and the Takings Clause, we can expect to see
more in the future. Both the expansion of forfeiture and failed
Constitutional challenges will produce more Taking Clause chal-
lenges as defense attorneys struggle to find some way to protect
their clients. This section will discuss the issue concerning prop-
erty which is contraband or proceeds from illegal activity and also
property which is merely in furtherance of illegal activity.
It has long been held that the government may not be
required to compensate an owner for property which it has
already lawfully acquired under the exercise of governmental
authority other than the power of eminent domain.297 Govern-
mental authority has been created under each of the above dis-
cussed forfeiture statutes. The purpose of forfeiture provisions is
to prevent the property from continued use in illegal activity,
deter illegal activity, and compensate society for injuries.29 8
These purposes make forfeiture a "police action" and therefore the
taking of property is not subject to compensation. Lawmakers are
free to determine that certain uses of property are undesirable
and that forfeiture is the proper response. 299 Accordingly, many
circuits have concluded that "if the federal government's actions
comport, procedurally and substantively, with the terms of a law-
fully enacted forfeiture statute, it may seize private property with-
out compensating the owner."30 0 Other circuits have stated that
"all property owners currently hold their property subject to the
restriction that if they use it in the commission of a criminal
offense it is forfeitable.""' Therefore, property which has been
296. U.S. CONST. amend. 5, cl. 5.
297. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 492 (1973); see United States v.
Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 125 (1967); Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680.
298. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682-83.
299. Van Oster, 272 U.S. 465.
300. United States v. One Parcel of Real Property with Buildings,
Appurtenances, and Improvements, Known as Plat 20, Lot 17, Great Harbor
Neck, New Shoreham, R.I., 960 F.2d 200, 209 (1st Cir. 1992); see Bolt v. United
States, 944 F.2d 603, 610 (9th Cir. 1991); Redford v. United States Dept. of
Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 691 F.2d 471, 473 (10th Cir.
1982).
301. Bowman v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 397, 406 (Fed. Cl. 1996).
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found to be forfeitable under a criminal or civil forfeiture process
is not subject to compensation.
The Takings Clause may offer protection when the govern-
ment cannot prove its case. Additionally, this clause may provide
protection to the "innocent-owner" who successfully asserts this
defense. As stated by the U.S. Federal Court of Claims,
[Ilt is plausible that an improper in rem forfeiture could give
rise to a taking claim. In cases where property is determined to
have been improperly forfeited because it is found that it was not
used for illicit purposes, it would seems that a property owner
legitimately may harbor an expectation of compensability. 0 2
As such, the time in-between the taking and returning of the
property in unsuccessful forfeiture actions may be compensatable
by the government as a taking.
Although the "innocent-owner" may be allowed some compen-
sation for the taking of the property, only when the government
fails in its case does this seem to offer any protection.3 °3 There-
fore, this protection is only available to those in little need. The
property owner who has recovered his property may be allowed
compensation, but the property owner who does not prevail will
not be allowed any compensation. Again, this clause offers little,
if any, protection to culpable or innocent property owners.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although Congress has expanded and the Supreme Court has
supported the efforts against the war on crime, the country has
suffered through the removal of constitutional protection. By rec-
ognizing the balancing between the war on crime and Constitu-
tional rights, perhaps this country can put the controversy to rest
by simply admitting the sacrifice of rights is necessary if we are to
win this battle. The Supreme Court is willing to call forfeiture
punishment in some cases and not punishment in others and to
call civil forfeiture civil in some cases and criminal in others.
These gross inconsistencies puportedly insure that law enforce-
ment has this "great weapon" to fight crime. The issues discussed
are examples of the magnitude and effect crime has on this society
and show that we, as a country, are willing to go very far to pre-
vent it.
302. Id.
303. Bennis.v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (Wife was not allow compensation even
though is was stipulated that wife was an innocent owner of a car).
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Although in most cases, the culpable party is required to for-
feit assets, this does not justify the infringement upon the funda-
mental principals embodied in the Constitution to be cast aside.
In balancing the war on crime against protecting Constitutional
rights, Congress has determined that the Constitution will be out-
weighed. However, Congress has merely responded to the tre-
mendous magnitude of crime and the damage it has done to this
country.
We must ask ourselves, which is the worst evil, the destruc-
tion and damage done by criminal activity or the eroding of the
foundation of this country, our constitutional rights?
Douglas Kim
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